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ONE PRIVILEGE TO RULE THEM ALL?
SOME POST-SARBANES-OXLEY AND OTHER
REFLECTIONS ON A FEDERALLY CODIFIED
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Timothy P. Glynn*
Recently, the attorney-client privilege has been the subject of
increased public and scholarly interest. Attorney-client
confidentiality concerns, including the privilege, were front and
center in the debate over new rules of professional conduct for issuer
counsel mandated by Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.' In addition, the decision of the Department of Justice
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 1989,
Harvard College; J.D. 1994, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
David Leonard and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this symposium. Thanks also to Michael Ambrosio, Kathleen
Boozang, Ahmed Bulbulia, Howard Erichson, Crystal Olsen Glynn, John
Jacobi, and Charles Sullivan for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
article, and to Brian McElroy and Julie Yoo for their research assistance. The
views expressed herein are entirely my own.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 307, 116 Stat. 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7245 (Supp II 2002)); see 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1 -. 7 (2004) (containing the final
rules). Section 307 and Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules,
and their effect on confidentiality and relationship to the privilege, have
received an enormous amount of attention. See, e.g., Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos.
33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6325 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003)
(discussing the significant number of comments submitted on the noisy
withdrawal provision and its effect on confidentiality); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 360-63 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the
SEC, 103 COLuM. L. REv. 1293, 1310 (2002) (discussing the gatekeeping
function of attorneys in the wake of recent corporate scandals) [hereinafter
Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper]; Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical
Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004)
(contending that both the final regulations and proposed regulations pursuant
to Sarbanes-Oxley will not adversely affect client confidences); Michael L.
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("DOJ") to allow monitoring of communications between detained
terrorism suspects and their attorneys2 has spawned an enormous
amount of controversy and commentary within the bar and legal
academia, much of which has focused on the privilege.3 Moreover,
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence has
decided to survey the state of federal evidentiary privileges,4
evincing renewed interest, even though it has no authority to alter
such privileges.
5
Fox, To Tell or Not to Tell: Legal Ethics and Disclosure After Enron, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 867, 908 (2002) (arguing that even under the up-the-
ladder reporting requirement, confidentiality will suffer); Susan J. Stabile,
Sarbanes-Oxley's Rules of Professional Responsibility Viewed Through a
Sextonian Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 31, 44-48 (2004) (discussing
the new and proposed requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley and concluding,
after addressing parallel issues in the attorney-client privilege context, that
these requirements will not adversely affect client confidences); Panel Three:
Ethical Dilemmas Associated with the Corporate Attorney's New Role, 52 AM.
U. L. REv. 655, 665-91 (2003) (discussing the ramifications of Section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the attorney-client privilege); see also
Letter from Seventy-seven Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 18, 2002) (expressing concerns
regarding the proposal of a "noisy withdrawal requirement"), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77lawfirms l.htm.
2. On October 31, 2001, the Justice Department announced that it had the
authority to monitor conversations between detainees and their attorneys
whenever the government has "substantial reason" to believe that the
conversations could facilitate violence or terrorism by passing on information
or instructions. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2004).
3. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice & Benjamin Parlin Saul, Is the War on Terrorism
a War on Attorney-Client Privilege?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 22, 23-24 (2002) (noting
that the monitoring of inmate conversations will create further uncertainty
regarding the attorney-client privilege); see also Marjorie Cohn, The
Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11,
2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1233, 1245 (2003) (arguing that the Bureau of
Prisons regulations will chill attorney-client communications). But see R.
Aubrey Davis III, Big Brother the Sneak or Big Brother the Sentry: Does a
New Bureau of Prisons Regulation Truly Abrogate the Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 27 HAMLINE L. REv. 163, 189-90 (2004) (concluding that the
procedural safeguards of the regulations ensure that the regulations will not
affect the privilege); Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and Security After September 11,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 404-05 (2002) (contending that the Bureau
of Prisons regulations will not curtail the privilege).
4. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of
October 18, 2002, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1002EVMin.pdf.
5. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
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The heightened attention will hopefully serve the interrelated
functions of illuminating the existing uncertainties in privilege
protections and producing genuine interest in reform. This
symposium therefore comes at a particularly opportune time,
providing another forum for exploring the current state of evidentiary
privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, and the merits of
codification.
In a previous article, Federalizing Privilege,6 I sought to
demonstrate that existing attorney-client privilege protections are far
too uncertain to serve the ends of the modem privilege. After tracing
both the scope and sources of this uncertainty, I argued that the
common-law method has not and cannot produce privilege doctrine
that provides sufficient certainty. Furthermore, piecemeal reforms,
including codification of a set of privilege rules applicable only in
the federal courts, while useful, would also fall short.7 I thus
concluded that Congress should enact preemptive privilege
legislation, providing uniform protections for attorney-client
communications that would apply in every proceeding in federal and
state court, as well as in arbitration, administrative, and legislative
proceedings. 8  Federal privilege legislation that provides clear,
unqualified, and generally applicable privilege protections will
produce a level of certainty sufficient to reap the benefits of the
privilege while lowering its transactions costs.
9
In this article, I again argue that the existing privilege regime is
unacceptable. I do so after considering the fresh critiques of
corporate-client confidentiality and the need for certainty that
emerged in the debates over Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and its regulatory progeny. I also trace why recent developments-
6. Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59
(2002).
7. Id. at 62-63, 134-41.
8. Id. at 64, 133.
9. Id. at 64. By "unqualified," I do not mean without exceptions. A
qualified privilege, as I use the term, means a privilege that is subject to a
judge's discretionary or post hoc balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis.
Any privilege regime, including an unqualified or absolute privilege, ought to
contain exceptions and waiver doctrines. These exceptions and doctrines are
both categorical and defined in advance, giving attorneys and clients notice of
the limits of the protection.
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including judicial decisions, law enforcement practices, and trends in
dispute resolution--only enhance my claim that privilege protections
are intolerably uncertain.
Given this, and given that the privilege is here to stay in one
form or another, I then address the vexing question of how to reform
the existing regime. The resolution of this question necessarily
hinges on an assessment of the benefits and risks of codifying the
privilege compared to the benefits and risks of allowing privilege
doctrine to continue to develop on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction,
case-by-case basis. But the choice is not simply one of codification
versus common law. Obviously, attorney-client privilege codes may
vary in substance (in other words, in the nature of their protections)
and one's prediction of the content will affect his or her ex ante
assessment of the benefits and risks of codification. Yet,
importantly, codes may also vary in breadth and depth of coverage.
For example, a privilege code may simply be a set of court-made
rules intended for application in a jurisdiction's judicial proceedings.
It may be intrajurisdictional but statutory, thus potentially applying
beyond judicial proceedings. Or, as I have advocated, a federal
codification may be statutory and preemptive, extending to all
judicial and non-judicial proceedings.
In the end, I adhere to the view that a federal, preemptive
privilege would be the best method of achieving sufficiently certain
privilege protections, and would thereby maximize the privilege's
benefits. Nevertheless, I recognize that this kind of reform is
unlikely. The issue, then, is whether codification of the privilege at
the federal level, on balance, is superior to a common-law privilege
even if the resulting code is less ambitious in scope than my previous
proposal. I conclude that federal codification is superior to retaining
the existing approach, not only because of the systemic problems
with the common law but also because the statutory approach to
formulating privilege doctrine offers a genuine opportunity for a
balanced deliberative process and has the potential to produce far
clearer substantive rules, long-term interjurisdictional convergence,
and collateral protections for client confidences.
Part I revisits the need for reasonable certainty through the lens
of very recent developments, including the treatment of
confidentiality concerns in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and underlying
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securities regulations, and in various privilege decisions and trends.
These developments-and in particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley
experience-shed new light on the interaction between the attorney-
client privilege and other areas of regulation and illuminate why and
how pressures on the privilege threaten its potential social benefits.
Part II addresses whether, and how, to reform the existing regime. It
first traces why the common-law method of developing privilege
doctrine is inadequate and responds to some of the arguments against
codification which favor retaining the common law. It then shows
why federal reform that is less ambitious, but more plausible, than
preemptive privilege legislation is still preferable to retaining the
common law. This article concludes by offering suggestions on
other measures-beyond substantive privilege protections-that will
enhance the effectiveness of a federally codified privilege.
I. THE NEED FOR GREATER CERTAINTY:
A SUMMARY AND UPDATE
In Federalizing Privilege, I argued that existing privilege
protections are so uncertain that they threaten the modem purposes
of the attorney-client privilege.' 0 This contention was based on two
10. Id. at 142-43. The dominant, modem rationale for the attorney-client
privilege is that "it fosters client candor and full communication between
attorneys and clients, which produce social benefits that outweigh the
privilege's social costs." Id. at 69; see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981); 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 344 (John W.
Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999). These social benefits include facilitating
effective legal representation, enhancing the ability of counsel to protect client
rights and interests, preserving the integrity of the adversarial process,
fostering respect for legitimate expectations of privacy, and promoting
compliance with the law and the underlying aims of the law. See Glynn, supra
note 6, at 68-71 (discussing the various justifications for the privilege and the
ends it serves). Among these interests, promoting ongoing legal compliance
and observance of the law is most important in the non-litigation, corporate
setting. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (emphasizing the role of the privilege in
promoting corporate compliance); Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note
1, at 1307-08 (suggesting that the promotion of legal compliance is the
primary potential benefit of the privilege in the securities context). The most
important adverse consequence of the privilege is that it may inhibit discovery
of relevant communications and may thereby create obstacles to ascertaining
the truth. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 71-72. Thus, there is general acceptance
of the utility of the privilege. There is also agreement that it should be
construed narrowly and that certain limitations, such as the crime-fraud
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premises. First, a level of certainty-"reasonable certainty"-in
privilege protections is needed to enhance (or at least avoid chilling)
client candor, and correspondingly, this is needed to produce the
purported social benefits of the privilege, including, inter alia,
facilitating legal compliance."1 Second, the existing privilege falls
far short of providing this level of certainty in most circumstances.'
2
Indeed, the current regime, which is characterized by
intrajurisdictional confusion, interjurisdictional conflict, and
decentralized decision making, has produced privilege law that is
both ambiguous in its doctrine and unpredictable in its application.13
This article will not retrace the arguments supporting these
premises. Recent developments, however, shed new light on the
need for reasonable certainty and the failings of the existing regime.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley, Confidentiality, and
the Corporate Client
The issue of certainty regarding the scope of protection of client
confidences has received rare public attention in the debate over how
to fix corporate governance in the wake of Enron and other Wall
Street scandals. Keenly aware that corporate counsel failed to
prevent the underlying misconduct 14 and, worse, sometimes
exception, are necessary to reduce or prevent misuse of the privilege and
resulting social harm. See id. at 71-73, 79-81. The privilege's aggregate
benefits and costs have not been, and cannot be, verified empirically, although
the privilege is accepted in every jurisdiction and few argue that it should be
abandoned. See id. at 73, 79-81. The lingering question is how to maximize
the foregoing benefits of the privilege while limiting the potential costs.
11. Id. at71.
12. Id. at 142-43.
13. Id. at 98-121 (outlining in detail the conflict and confusion surrounding
the privilege's basic elements, important exceptions, and various waiver
doctrines).
14. See New Release, Committee on Energy and Commerce Democrats,
Statement of Congressman John Dingell on Enron (Nov. 29, 2001) (restating
Judge Stanley Sporkin's critique from Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Wall,
743 F. Supp. 901, 919-20 (D.C. 1990), available at http://www.
house.gov/commercedemocrats/press/107nr28.htm. "Where was the SEC?
Where was FASB? Where was Enron's audit committee? Where were the
accountants? Where were the lawyers?" Id. (emphasis added).
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participated in it,15 Congress enacted Section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. 16  This section directed the Securities and Exchange
15. 148 CONG. REC. S6552, S6555-56 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statements
of Sens. Edwards, Enzi, and Corzine) (discussing how lawyers failed to
prevent corporate corruption and sometimes were central participants in it); see
Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud. See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 195, 198-210 (2003) [hereinafter Koniak, Corporate Fraud] (outlining
how lawyers have been central to recent corporate wrongdoings); Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1239-43 (2003) [hereinafter Koniak, Hurlyburly]
(noting that lawyers actively participated in ongoing corporate violations).
16. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides:
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a
rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation
by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or
the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent
thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures
or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney
to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of
directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board or to
another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of
directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to
the board of directors.
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp II 2002). This section was the result of an amendment
offered by Senators Edwards, Enzi, and Corzine. See 148 CONG. REC. S6580
(daily ed. July 10, 2002). The substance of the amendment is based on a
recommendation for an up-the-ladder reporting rule contained in a letter forty
law professors submitted to the SEC, which was forwarded to Congress after
the SEC took no action. See id. at S6552 (statement of Sen. Edwards)
(referring to the letter and how then-Chairman Harvey L. Pitt never responded
to his inquiry regarding whether to act consistent with the letter's
recommendations); id. at S6557 (stating that the amendment parallels what the
letter recommended); Letter From Several Professors of Securities Regulation
and/or Professional Responsibility of Noted Law Schools to Harvey L. Pitt,
Chairman, SEC (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Letter from Several Professors]
(asking the SEC to promulgate a rule requiring "a lawyer who represents a
corporation in connection with its securities law compliance to inform the
client's board of directors if the lawyer knows that the client is violating the
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Commission ("SEC") to promulgate rules of professional conduct for
attorneys practicing before it, mandating that issuer attorneys report
material violations of securities laws to chief legal or executive
officers and then, if no appropriate remedial action is taken, to a
committee of outside directors.' 7 The SEC's consideration of these
"up-the-ladder" reporting requirements and its initial proposal to
require corporate counsel to make a "noisy withdrawal"' 8 from issuer
representation in certain circumstances (i.e., informing the SEC of
the decision to withdraw) produced vigorous public discussions
about the role of client confidentiality in facilitating legal
compliance. 19
Many, including the American Bar Association ("ABA"),
criticized aspects of up-the-ladder reporting requirements2° and, even
more so, the proposed noisy withdrawal obligations. 2 1  A core
criticism was that some of the new requirements would chill client
candor by undermining the confidential relationship attorneys and
their clients enjoy as a result of attorneys' professional obligation to
maintain confidentiality and the protections afforded by the attorney-
securities laws and senior management does not promptly
rectify the violation."), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf; see also 148 CONG. REC. S6555 (statement of
Sen. Enzi) ("I am usually in the camp that believes States should regulate
professionals within their jurisdiction. However, in this case, the State bars as a
whole have failed.").
17. 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
18. The SEC originally proposed, and continues to consider, requiring an
attorney to resign and report violations to the SEC when a corporate client has
not made an appropriate response after being notified of an ongoing material
violation. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6324 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (setting forth the proposed noisy withdrawal
requirements and the alternative of an issuer report to the SEC).
19. See supra note 1. The SEC received over 150 comment letters during
the initial comment period on the proposed rules. Stabile, supra note 1, at 39.
20. See American Bar Association, Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.,
President, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002) (commenting
on the up-the-ladder requirements and urging changes to them), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm; see also Letter
from Seventy-seven Law Firms, supra note 1 (commenting on the same).
21. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, supra note 20 (urging on behalf of
the ABA that the noisy withdrawal provisions not be adopted); Letter from
Seventy-seven Law Firms, supra note 1.
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client privilege.22 Full and frank attorney-client communications, the
critics have contended, are necessary for attorneys to serve the
critical function of fostering legal compliance with securities 
laws.23
Others have disagreed, arguing that these new obligations are
unlikely to reduce communications with attorneys within the
corporation; 24 that, even if some communications were chilled, most
socially desirable communications would not be chilled;25 and that,
22. For example, in a December 18, 2002, letter from seventy-seven law
firms, the firms contended that regulations under the Act will result in a loss of
candor and trust within the attorney-client relationship and, consequently, "the
public will inevitably be harmed in some cases when it need not have been."
Letter from Seventy-seven Law Firms, supra note 1; see also Panel 2: The
Evolution of Corporate Governance, Washington, D.C., Friday, November 22,
2002, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 624 (2003) (comments of Professor Roberta
Karmel) ("Although the SEC says that it does not intend to impair zealous
advocacy essential to the SEC's processes, or discourage issuers from seeking
effective and creative legal advice, in my opinion, this is precisely what the
rule is going to do. It is going to make securities attorneys into a band of
policemen working partly for their clients and partly for the SEC.").
23. See Letter from Seventy-seven Law Firms, supra note 1; Robert J.
Jossen, Dealing with the Lawyer's Responsibilities Under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002: Ethical Dilemmas and Practical Considerations, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: SARBANES-OXLEY INSTITUTE, 667, 711 (2003) (referring
to the comments of Susan P. Koniak et al.) ("[R]equiring noisy withdrawal
would not further the [SEC]'s goals, because it would cause clients to exclude
attorneys from meetings where sensitive information was exchanged that could
lead an attorney to think a material violation has been committed."), WL SJ064
ALI-ABA 667, 711; see also Panel 2: The Evolution of Corporate
Governance, supra note 22, at 627 (comments of Professor Stuart Kaswell) ("It
will turn into a fear relationship where they are afraid to view the lawyers as
part of the team to keep the company out of trouble. I think that the net effect
of that will backfire.").
24. See Stabile, supra note 1, at 44-45 ("The first question is whether there
is any concern that the up-the-ladder reporting requirement will have a chilling
effect on attorney-client communication. The simple answer is no.... [C]lients
already know such reporting is possible in the case of violations of law. Since
client reaction is hardly likely to depend on the particulars of the reporting
standard, if any chilling were likely, it would already be occurring.").
25. See Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 1, at 1307-08 ("[T]he
practical issue becomes whether gatekeeper obligations would necessarily chill
desirable attorney-client communications.... A starting point for this analysis
should be the recognition that the client knows little law and will almost
always want to know if contemplated action is illegal. From this premise, it
follows that the corporate official contemplating prospective action will still
inquire of counsel whether the course of action under consideration is
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on balance, the benefits of mandated attorney disclosure would
exceed the costs of reduced candor.
26
The SEC has promulgated final rules that include up-the-ladder
reporting requirements. 2 7 After acknowledging the need to study
carefully the impact of a noisy withdrawal requirement on client
candor, however, the Commission agreed to defer its decision on
such a provision.28 It has yet to enact a final rule regarding noisy
withdrawal and has asked for comments on less onerous alternatives,
including mandating attorney withdrawal without attorney notice to
the agency.
2 9
The implications of this debate for the role of lawyers in
corporate governance, and correspondingly, the role of the attorney-
client privilege in the regulation of the corporation could not be more
profound. There is growing agreement that issuers' attorneys, along
lawful.... In short, it is the ex post inquiry by the client of the attorney that is
most likely to be chilled.").
26. See id. at 1309-10 (noting that "even if it were true that clients would
consult their lawyers less often, this impact could be more than fully offset by
the fact that it would become more dangerous to disregard the lawyers'
advice"); see also Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 15, at 229-30
(arguing in favor of a robust noisy withdrawal or disclosure requirement).
27. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a)-(c) (2004); see also Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-
47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (setting forth the final up-the-ladder
requirement and providing commentary on the rule) [hereinafter Final Rule].
The rules also provide for permissive disclosure on the part of the attorney in
circumstances in which the attorney believes it is necessary to prevent the
issuer from committing a material violation of securities laws that is likely to
cause substantial financial injury to the issuer or investors, to prevent the issuer
from committing perjury or committing a fraud upon the SEC, or to rectify
substantial injuries to the issuer or investor. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d). This
permissive disclosure provision adds little to the permissive disclosures
allowed under the rules of professional conduct of most states. See M. Peter
Moser & Stanley Keller, Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or
Informers? 49 VILL. L. REv. 833, 838 (2004) ("This permissive reporting rule
resembles exceptions in the ABA Model Rules and lawyer conduct rules that
apply in all but eight states.").
28. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6324-37 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003). The SEC has yet to take final action on its
proposed "noisy withdrawal" provisions.
29. See id. at 6329-30 (discussing proposed Section 205.3(e), which would
require the issuer to report the withdrawal of the attorney).
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with auditors, market analysts, independent board members, and
perhaps others, must be viewed as "gatekeepers," private
intermediaries upon which the integrity of the securities markets
depend. 30 And Congress and the SEC, along with many practitioners
and scholars, now agree that our securities and corporate law regimes
should be structured-or perhaps more aptly, restructured-to
facilitate such gatekeeping. 3 1 Yet, although federal securities laws in
general and most of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seek to foster market
integrity largely through disclosure,32 the attorney-as-gatekeeper
function may not be best served by more attorney disclosure.
30. See Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 1, at 1305-08
(discussing the gatekeeping role); Leslie Wharton, What Impact Will the New
SEC Rules Have on the Attorney-Client Privilege? 10 Bus. TORTS J. 4 (2003)
("In the post-Enron environment... the SEC may be more inclined to proceed
against counsel, whose failure as 'gatekeepers' the SEC views as a major
contributor to issuer non-compliance."), http://www.arnoldporter.com/
pubs/files/WhartonBTJSum_2003.pdf. Obviously, since many comm-
entators have now adopted the term "gatekeeper," it has no single meaning,
and the views regarding how gatekeeping is best achieved certainly will differ.
As I use the term, a gatekeeper is a professional, sufficiently independent and
appropriately positioned to assess issuer disclosures and protect investors
through disclosure, withholding necessary consent to issuer actions, or other
means. As I discuss, the optimal means of serving this gatekeeping function
may vary by the type of gatekeeper. See, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure,
supra note 1.
31. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6552, S6555-56 (daily ed. July 10, 2002)
(statements of Sens. Edwards, Enzi, and Corzine) (emphasizing, in offering the
amendment that became Section 307, the role attorneys play in ensuring
market integrity); Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6325 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) ("[T]he Commission, and the investing public,
must be able to rely upon the integrity of in-house and retained lawyers who
represent issuers before the Commission. Attorneys also play an important and
expanding role in the internal processes and governance of issuers, ensuring
compliance with applicable reporting and disclosure requirements, including
requirements mandated by the federal securities laws."); see also William H.
Donaldson, Speech by SEC Chairman: Remarks to the Practicing Law Institute
(Nov. 6, 2003) ("One of the [Act's] most important objectives is to strengthen
the performance of the traditional 'gatekeepers' to the markets, especially
public company accountants, research analysts and lawyers." (emphasis
added)), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch 110603whd.htm.
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(stating, in the full title that the purpose of the Act is "[to] protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant
to the securities laws").
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Indeed, if the instrumentalist justifications for corporate counsel's
obligation to maintain confidentiality and the corporate attorney-
client privilege are sound, 33 then shielding at least some attorney-
client confidences from disclosure will foster greater issuer
compliance with securities laws and, hence, shareholder interests,
even if this occasionally means that some intracorporate information
will not be revealed or discovered.34
Much has been said and written about the SEC's various
proposals and their implications for the privilege. This article will
not reexamine the entire debate. Rather, it will offer several
observations on what Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC's actions, and the
underlying debate tell us about where the attorney-client privilege
fits into the larger discussion of corporate governance and how to
approach privilege reform.
To begin with, Congress's passage of Section 307 and the SEC's
actions reflect intent to strike a balance between maintaining the
relationship of trust and confidence between counsel and the
corporation and achieving greater scrutiny of securities attorneys'
conduct. 35 On one hand, Section 307 makes clear Congress's desire
33. See supra note 31 (summarizing these justifications).
34. See, e.g., supra note 31; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 392 (1981) (indicating that ensuring the client's compliance with the law
is one of the ends of the corporate privilege); JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ,
ATrORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.12 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that
the privilege promotes law-abiding behavior); see also Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos.
33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6326 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) ("At the
same time, the Commission does not want the rule to impair zealous advocacy,
which is important to the Commission's processes. The Commission also does
not want the rule to discourage issuers from seeking and obtaining appropriate
and effective legal advice.").
35. See, e.g., Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6326 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (stating the Commission believes that the
proposed rules "deter instances of attorney and issuer misconduct, and, where
misconduct has occurred, reduce its impact on issuers and their shareholders.
At the same time, the Commission does not want the rule to impair zealous
advocacy, which is important to the Commission's processes. The Commission
also does not want the rule to discourage issuers from seeking and obtaining
appropriate and effective legal advice."); see also 148 CONG. REc.$6552,
S6555-57 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statements of Sen. Enzi, Sen. Edwards,
and Sen. Sarbanes) (discussing the care that was taken to ensure that the
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to have the SEC monitor more closely how issuer attorneys act.
Indeed, despite protests that regulation of the practice of law is best
left to the bar and individual jurisdictions of practice,36 Congress
decided to impose more rigorous or at least more clear standards of
professionalism and other legal constraints on securities lawyers,
37
and the SEC has since acted pursuant to that mandate.38 At the same
time, however, Congress and the SEC have seemingly embraced the
notion that protecting client confidences assists in promoting
compliance with the law.39  For example, Section 307's up-the-
amendment that became Section 307 would not threaten the attorney-client
privilege nor mandate that disclosures be made outside the corporate client).
36. See Cohn, supra note 3 (arguing that even proposed regulations, such as
the noisy withdrawal provisions, threaten the independence of the legal
profession); Gary Young, ABA Moves to Work with SEC on New Conduct
Rules, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18, 2002, at A31 ("Before Section 307 became law,
the ABA's main complaint was that it put attorney discipline, until now the
exclusive domain of the state courts, into the hands of a federal agency.");
Roberta S. Karmel, A Bid to Regulate the Entire Bar, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 19, 2002,
at 3 ("[S]ince the substantive provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley changes this line
between federal and state law only with respect to a few particularized matters,
such as the composition of audit committees and loans to executive officers
and directors, it would be anomalous if Congress expanded the SEC's
jurisdiction to regulate attorneys to matters beyond the SEC's jurisdiction to
regulate public corporations.").
37. See 148 CONG. REc. at S6562 (statement of Sen. Edwards) (discussing
the need to mandate through new rules of professional conduct that lawyers, in
addition to accountants and executives ensure that the law is being followed);
id. at S6555 (statement of Sen. Enzi) ("I am usually in the camp that believes
States should regulate professionals within their jurisdiction. However, in this
case, the State bars as a whole have failed.").
38. Indeed, in considering a noisy withdrawal requirement, the SEC
appears to have construed its mandate broadly, at least initially. See Otis
Bilodeau, SEC Rules on Lawyers Draw Flak, Plan Blasted by Corporate Bar
and by Advocates of Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at I ("The SEC's
summary of the proposed rules makes clear that the commission has opted to
cover more territory than Sarbanes-Oxley specifically requires."). Some,
however, contend that the SEC ultimately did not go far enough in ensuring
attorneys report misconduct up the ladder. See, e.g., Koniak, Hurlyburly,
supra note 15, at 1274-77.
39. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6326 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) ("The Commission also does not want the rule to
discourage issuers from seeking and obtaining appropriate and effective legal
advice."). Senator Edwards stressed that the reporting requirements that were
to be embodied in Section 307 would be strictly internal, and impose no
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ladder requirements impose no external disclosure obligation on
issuer counsel (which would reveal intracorporate confidences).4 °
Likewise, the Commission's decision to defer its final determination
on noisy withdrawal-whether correct or not-shows its sensitivity
to client confidentiality concerns.
4 1
Neither Section 307 nor the underlying regulations directly
address the substance of attorney-client privilege protections.
Nevertheless, the privilege has been part of the conversation
throughout, and these provisions-and the balance they strike-
reflect the value Congress and the SEC place on attorney-issuer
confidentiality, for which the attomey-client privilege provides core
protection.42 In fact, in offering the amendment that became Section
307, Senator Enzi emphasized that the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement would be entirely intra-corporate and would not breach
obligation to report externally to the SEC. See 148 CONG. REC. at S6557
("[T]he only obligation that [Section 307] creates is the obligation to report to
the client.... There is no obligation to report anything outside the client-the
corporation.").
40. In his statements supporting the amendment that became Section 307,
Senator Enzi emphasized that the reporting requirements for lawyers would be
less onerous than those required for accountants and that up-the-ladder
obligations would not breach the privilege. See 148 CONG. REc. at S6555
(statement of Sen. Enzi).
41. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6326 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) ("The Commission also does not want the rule to
discourage issuers from seeking and obtaining appropriate and effective legal
advice. In this regard, the Commission today is proposing for comment
alternative provisions to the 'noisy withdrawal' provisions contained in the
Proposing Release."). Critics suggest this is an example of the Commission
succumbing to pressure from the bar and legal organizations. See, e.g.,
Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 15, at 230. The ABA and other legal
groups clearly influenced the decision. Nevertheless, I believe that the
Commission appropriately considered the implications for issuer-attorney
confidentiality. Ultimately, as I state below, I support a noisy withdrawal
provision, but I believe preserving confidentiality in general is essential in
facilitating attorney gatekeeping.
42. See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that although the attorney's
ethical obligation to keep client confidences and the attorney-client privilege
are not co-extensive in terms of their protection, they emanate from the same
concern).
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the privilege.43 Similarly, the SEC has acknowledged the role the
privilege plays in protecting confidences and has sought to ensure
that the rules are consistent with the aims of the privilege." This
recognition is embodied in the SEC's final up-the-ladder provision,
which states that, by making the required report to the issuer's
officers or directors, "an attorney does not reveal client confidences
or secrets or privileged or otherwise protected information related to
the attorney's representation of an issuer.,
45
Indeed, in my view, neither the up-the-ladder requirements, nor
a narrowly tailored noisy withdrawal provision will undermine the
aims of client confidentiality or the privilege. Up-the-ladder
reporting is entirely consistent with the justification for the corporate
privilege.46 This privilege does not ensure that each corporate actor's
communications with counsel will be kept confidential vis-h-vis
other corporate actors; on the contrary, the entity is the client, and
thus, counsel must share gathered information with corporate
43. 148 CONG. REC. at S6555; see also id. at S6557 (statements of Sens.
Edwards and Sarbanes) (confirming in an interchange the importance of the
internal nature of the reporting requirement).
44. See, e.g., Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306-07 (Feb.
6, 2003) (withdrawing an attorney-documentation requirement in part out of
concerns for client vulnerability to adverse judicial decisions on the privilege);
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6329 (proposed Feb.
6, 2003) (emphasizing privilege concerns).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2004). The SEC does, however, allow
attorneys to use the report-which may otherwise be privileged information
owned by the issuer-in connection with any investigation, proceeding, or
litigation in which the attorney's compliance with up-the-ladder requirements
is at issue. See id. §205.3(d)(1).
46. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. at S6555 (statement of Senator Enzi) ("The
attorney owes a duty to its client which is the corporation and the shareholders.
By reporting a legal violation to management and then the board of directors,
no breach of the privilege occurs, because it is all internal."); Stabile, supra
note 1, at 48-49; see also Moser & Keller, supra note 27, at 837 (suggesting
that up-the-ladder requirements produce benefits and have found general
acceptance because they are consistent with existing legal norms). This does
not mean that the particular up-the-ladder reporting regime the SEC ultimately
adopted is perfect. It could, for example, provide clearer guidance for
attorneys in some contexts, which would assist them in satisfying their
professional duties.
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decision makers.4 7  The up-the-ladder requirements simply define
who the appropriate decision makers are and mandate how and when
attorneys must share certain information with these decision
makers.48
Moreover, a noisy withdrawal provision that provides for
intracorporate exhaustion (disclosure to upper management with the
corresponding opportunity to correct) before notice of withdrawal to
the SEC-for which each of the proposed withdrawal rules
provide4 9-will not chill the candor the privilege may promote as
long as the parameters of the obligation are sufficiently precise so as
to not create the appearance of some broad duty to disclose. 50 In
47. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a) (clarifying that the issuer, rather than
individual officers, directors, or employees is the client); see also 148 CONG.
REC. at S6555-56 (statements of Sens. Enzi and Corzine) (same); Letters from
Several Professors, supra note 16 (stating that the corporation is the client and
that attorneys therefore have an ethical obligation to inform the corporation's
directors of corporate wrongdoing); Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 15,
at 217 (describing the failures of lawyers in Enron). "[T]he lawyers' client
was the company, not management or directors, and when criminal activity
was about to jeopardize the company's future and thus the fortunes of its
shareholder-owners, lawyers had to act to protect the client by telling
management and directors to cease or notify the authorities." Id. Under state
and federal corporate law, corporate decision makers are those persons that
corporate law-state and federal-assigns authority to act on behalf of the
entity. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2002) (allocating to directors
the power to manage the affairs of the corporation).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a) (discussing reporting obligations of issuer
attorneys). Indeed, Section 307 and the underlying rules address the pre-
existing widespread practice among corporate counsel to report only to officers
or other insiders, not to the truly independent members of the board (if there
are any). They therefore addresses the ongoing corporate law problem of
undue insider influence and weak boards of directors. See, e.g., 148 CONG.
REC. at S6551 (indicating that lawyers who start to believe and act as if the
CEO, rather than the entity, is the client is one cause for the problems on Wall
Street).
49. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47283, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324,
6324 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003); see also 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (requiring an
attorney to initially "report such evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer (or
the equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal officer and its chief
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith").
50. Absent sufficiently clear obligations, both the attorney and the issuer
may be deterred from communicating. See Moser & Keller, supra note 27, at
848-49 (suggesting the mere existence of a noisy withdrawal requirement is
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fact, the proposed withdrawal provisions require no direct disclosure
of client confidences, nor would they significantly expand corporate
attorneys' existing withdrawal obligations. 51 Also, if exhaustion and
the up-the-ladder requirement serve their purpose, there will almost
never be a need for such a withdrawal.52 And, in the rare
circumstance in which issuer counsel is compelled to withdraw, the
underlying communications may not be privileged anyway, since
withdrawal-precipitating communications may reflect decision
maker intent to induce counsel to assist in fraudulent or criminal
conduct and, hence, may fall within even a narrowly tailored crime-
fraud exception to the privilege.
53
likely to deter communications). Although I am concerned about the
misperceptions and, hence, the candor-deterring effects of a mandatory noisy
withdrawal provision, I believe that a carefully drawn provision that is both
clear in its scope and its status as a "last resort" will not deter most
communications.
51. See Koniak, Hurlyburly, supra note 15, at 1270; Stabile, supra note 1,
at 47; Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Preliminary
Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, July 16, 2002, 58 Bus. LAW. 189, 209 (2002) (outlining
preliminary recommendations of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct). There is, however, some tension between the
permissive disclosure provisions and some state disclosure rules. See, e.g.,
Brooke A. Masters, New Rules Leave Lawyers in Bind on Whistle-Blowing,
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2003, at EO1 (discussing the tensions between the SEC's
fmal and proposed rules and those promulgated and supported by state bar
associations). But see James M. McCauley, Corporate Responsibility and the
Regulation of Corporate Lawyers, VA. LAW REG., Nov. 2002, at 3 (noting that
thirty-seven states permit disclosure to prevent a client's ongoing fraud and 4
states require such disclosure), available at http://www.vsb.org/
publications/valawyer/nov02/legalethics.pdf.
52. See Moser & Keller, supra note 27, at 848 (opposing withdrawal, but
suggesting that it will apply in the rarest of situations). Indeed, New Jersey's
rules of professional conduct provide for mandatory disclosure to prevent
certain prospective financial harms resulting from fraud. See N.J. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1), 1.13.
53. Although the scope and operation of the crime-fraud exception is far
from clear, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, at minimum, the
exception prevents clients from using the privilege to shield from discovery
communications with counsel made for the purpose of furthering or facilitating
the commission of a crime or fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S.
554, 562-63 (1989) (addressing the crime-fraud exception). To determine
whether the exception applies, a court will engage in an in camera review of
the allegedly privileged communications after the party seeking discovery
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Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC's new rules will not, in all
likelihood, conflict with the privilege or otherwise threaten the
relationship of trust and confidence between issuers and their
attorneys. The far greater danger, in my view, is that a new attorney-
as-gatekeeper regime will fail to achieve its purposes. Heightened
standards of professionalism are insufficient, alone, to facilitate
attorney gatekeeping. 54 Up-the-ladder reporting, for example, will
foster compliance only if the principals in the corporate structure-
high-ranking corporate officers, directors, and securities lawyers-
otherwise have sufficient incentives to facilitate monitoring and full
communication within the enterprise. 55 That individual officers and
employees (who may have conflicting incentives and neither own
nor control corporate confidences) might be disinclined to speak
freely with corporate counsel is not news.56 It is therefore incumbent
demonstrates a factual basis adequate to support a reasonable and good faith
belief that such a review may reveal evidence that the exception applies. See
id. at 572.
54. See, e.g., David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who
Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing
Public Corporations? 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 873, 879-80 (2003) ("[I]t is not
enough that the attorney be aware of these professional responsibilities. The
attorney now must strive to make the corporation's officers, managers, and
directors understand that the attorney's duties run solely to the corporation
itself.... The attorney representing a corporation, therefore, must separate the
interests of the corporation from those of the individual representatives with
whom the attorney interacts and to whom the attorney must answer.").
55. See Stabile, supra note 1, at 49 ("The voluntary compliance model,
however, works only when companies actually conform their behavior in
accordance with the law. Sole reliance on an up-the-ladder reporting
requirement assumes that the board to whose attention the violation of law is
brought has the ability and the will to address the problem."); Beck, supra note
54, at 880 ("Compliance with the up-the-ladder reporting provision will require
that outside counsel remain vigilant in their role, and that their unbridled duties
of care and loyalty are to the corporation."); see also Panel Three: Ethical
Dilemmas Associated with the Corporate Attorney's New Role, supra note 1, at
666-67 ("In a practical world, I do not know of a single general counsel who
honestly believes that they would report up-the-ladder of their management,
and even beyond their management to the board .... ")
56. See Robert A. Desilets, Sr., The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and the Securities Attorney: Confidentiality, Confusion, and the Need for
Change, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 611, 612 (1994) (noting that there are a "myriad
of competing interests" within the corporation); see also Thomas D. Morgan,
Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, in the Effort to Improve
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upon corporate decision makers to compel cooperation with counsel
and to develop effective oversight and information gathering
mechanisms to ensure that both they and counsel receive as much
reliable information as possible.
Plainly speaking, the law must create layers of incentives for
decision makers to keep counsel genuinely "in the loop" on all
securities matters and then for principal corporate actors, including
attorneys, to act appropriately on the information they receive.
Recent events on Wall Street offer a stark reminder that such
incentives cannot be taken for granted. 57  Sarbanes-Oxley and its
regulatory progeny have sought to address these problems in a
variety of ways beyond the rules of professional conduct discussed
here, including facilitating greater director independence and
oversight; 58 expanding disclosure obligations for various high-
Corporate Lawyers' Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 27
(2003) ("A corporation has no single pair of eyes whose reliability can give the
lawyer confidence in the information received. No matter how a lawyer tries to
ascertain the truth in a corporate context, there will always be the prospect that
the appearance is other than the reality."); Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the
American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59 Bus.
LAW. 145, 150 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report] ("Direct
operational control of American public corporations is, and must remain,
primarily in the hands of their senior executive officers... This ... may give
rise to potential conflicts of interest and other motivational problems that
present persistent challenges for effective corporate governance.").
57. See, e.g., Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 15, at 196-211; see also
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 1185, 1190 (2003) ("[Enron's managers'] fraud
could not have been carried out without the lawyers' active approval, passive
acquiescence, or failure to inquire and investigate.").
58. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000) (requiring that audit committees be
independent and defining independence); 15 U.S.C. § 7245(2) (Supp II 2002)
("[I]f the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence...
requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the
board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of
directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by
the issuer, or to the board of directors." (emphasis added)); 17 C.F.R. §
205.2(k)(1) (2004) (defining qualified legal compliance committee as
consisting of "at least one member of the issuer's audit committee... and two
or more members of the issuer's board of directors who are not employed,
directly or indirectly, by the issuer and who are not, in the case of a registered
investment company, 'interested persons. ' (emphasis added)).
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ranking officers; 59 and enhancing professional, civil, and criminal
sanctions for officers and attorneys who fail to comply with
securities mandates.
60
These improvements may not be adequate, however. To begin
with, like many commentators, I believe other aspects of Sarbanes-
Oxley do not go far enough in promoting appropriate incentives on
the part of corporate officers, directors, and various gatekeepers
(including attorneys).6' In addition, although Section 307 is an
important step in the right direction, I agree with some of the critics
that the up-the-ladder reporting requirements would be more
59. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp II 2002) (providing additional
reporting requirements for certain officers).
60. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-204, secs. 304-05, 801-906, 116 Stat. 745,
778-79, 800-06 (2002) (codified as amended in various sections of the U.S.C.)
(providing enhanced professional, civil, and criminal penalties for corporate
officials who violate federal securities laws); 17 C.F.R. § 205.6 (providing for
civil and professional penalties for attorneys who fail to comply with their
professional obligations); Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the
Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions,
Spitzer's Clash with Donaldson over Turf the Choice of Civil or Criminal
Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
443, 455 (2004) (discussing the severe criminal penalties the Act imposes on
those found guilty of violating relevant portions of federal securities laws).
61. For example, I believe Congress should have done more to ensure that
the bulk of directors will be truly independent. See, e.g., ABA Task Force
Report, supra note 56, at 177-78 (arguing in favor of mandating that a
majority of the board be independent, and listing other proponents of such a
mandate). Moreover, I agree with Professor Koniak that Congress should have
abrogated Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994), and thereby revived the "aiding and abetting" theory-applicable
against lawyers and others corporate agents who assist in securities fraud-in
private actions under Section lOb-5. See Koniak, Hurlyburly, supra note 15, at
1268. I also agree with Professor Coffee that corporate actors including
attorneys should be subject to sanctions or liability for failing to act with due
diligence. See Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 1, at 1310-11. I am
also in favor of subjecting highest-ranking officers to strict or near-strict
liability for securities fraud attributable to the issuer. See also Coffee,
Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 1, at 346-53 (discussing the benefits of a strict
liability for various corporate actors, yet concluding that a modified strict
liability system would be most effective). Indeed, I recently argued that high-
ranking corporate officers ought to be vicarious liable for corporate torts and
tort-like statutory violations. See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond "Unlimiting"
Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57
VAND. L. REv. 329 (2004).
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effective if they were clearer and more demanding. 62 And I believe
regulation of counsels' conduct ought to go further, including not
only a noisy withdrawal requirement, but also, as Professor Coffee
has advocated, some kind of due diligence obligation, at least for
attorneys serving the gatekeeping function.
63
Yet, in addition, although the SEC has emphasized the
importance of maintaining attorney-issuer confidentiality in
promoting compliance,64 it has not and perhaps cannot regulate
extrinsic pressures on such confidences, including pressures on the
attorney-client privilege. The Commission recognized as much in
withdrawing a provision from its final up-the-ladder rules that would
have required attorneys to retain documentation of their internal
62. See, e.g., Koniak, Hurlyburly, supra note 15, at 1274-77; Jossen, supra
note 23, at 699 (Koniak comments) ("Any lawyer worth her salt will almost
always be able to conclude that it is not 'unreasonable' to conclude that the
evidence before her demonstrates legal conduct. Why? Because lawyers are
trained to reimagine evidence of illegality as evidence of legality. Because the
ethos of lawyers is not to report up the corporate ladder.... The [SEC]'s
standard is an invitation to inaction."); see also Coffee, Attorney as
Gatekeeper, supra note 1, at 1310-13 (proposing additional attorney
obligations, including a due diligence obligation and a certification
requirement); Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 1.
63. See, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 1, at 359-60. I am
also sympathetic to arguments in favor of requiring independent (outside)
issuer counsel to certify securities disclosures in addition to performing due
diligence. See id. at 355-56. I would tentatively question the need and
advisability of such a requirement, if it were imposed on all attorneys assisting
in securities transactions, not just those serving the independent gatekeeping
function. As long as issuer counsel is properly constrained by a combination
of robust professional obligations (e.g., up-the-ladder reporting, noisy
withdrawal, and due diligence obligations) and the risk of biting civil and
criminal sanctions, there should be sufficient incentives to uncover, report
appropriately, and seek to prevent or remedy inadequate disclosures.
Moreover, the specter of direct public disclosures by all corporate attorneys is
more likely to chill candor and communication with counsel than are the other
existing and proposed obligations, even when corporate decision makers seek
in good faith to comply with securities requirements. See infra notes 72-73
and accompanying text.
64. See Jossen, supra note 23, at 705 ("[T]he [SEC] apparently took
concerns that 'our clients will not confide in us anymore' seriously enough to
lead it to change from its original proposal to its alternatives .. . ."); id. at 719
(noting that adverse effects on attorney-client privilege will ultimately lead to
harm for the issuers, markets, and economy).
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reporting efforts. 65 Indeed, the Commission stated that while it "may
be of the view that such documentation should be protected by the
attorney-client privilege, the applicability of the privilege will be
decided by the courts," and, "thus, there is considerable uncertainty
as to whether it will be protected.' '6 6 Convinced that this risk might
increase issuers' vulnerability in litigation and foster a perception of
attorneys as conflicted, the Commission concluded that the potential
adverse effects of such a documentation requirement on client candor
outweigh its potential benefits.
67
Given this recognition, and the broader emphasis on
confidentiality, it is somewhat surprising that the discussion of
Sarbanes-Oxley has largely overlooked the fundamental question of
whether existing attorney-client privilege protections are otherwise
sufficient to ensure corporate decision makers and attorneys promote
full communication and, correspondingly, facilitate legal
compliance. If not, then the benefits of confidentiality Section 307
and the underlying rules seek to preserve may be jeopardized. In
other words, no one has addressed whether reform of underlying
attorney-client privilege law might be needed or at least helpful in
facilitating the attorney gatekeeping the post-Sarbanes-Oxley
securities regime envisions.
68
65. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306-07 (Feb.
6, 2003).
66. Id. at 6307 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 6306-07.
68. The closest the discussion has come to this involved another withdrawn
provision of the up-the-ladder requirements, which would have provided that
the privileged status of issuer-attorney communications would not be waived
vis-A-vis third parties if the communications were shared with the Commission
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. See id. at 6312. With regard to such a"selective waiver" rule, the Commission stated as follows:
Several commentaters stated that it was uncertain if the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act granted the Commission the authority to promulgate a rule
that would control determinations by state and federal courts whether
a disclosure to the Commission, even if conditioned on a
confidentiality agreement, waives the attorney-client privilege or work
product protection, and a few suggested that the proposed paragraph
would conflict with Federal Rule of Evidence 501. They noted that
this is an unsettled issue in the courts, or suggested that the
Commission's proposed rule runs contrary to the bulk of decisional
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A few defenders of the original noisy withdrawal proposal have
questioned the extent to which protecting attorney-client
communications-via attorney confidentiality obligations or the
privilege-is actually necessary to promote compliance.
69 Their
principal contention is that corporate decision makers seeking to
comply with securities laws have other, sufficient incentives to
promote socially beneficial communications with counsel.
7 °
Although I support a clear and narrowly tailored noisy withdrawal
requirement, I believe that protection for many client confidences is
authority on this issue. A few also noted that proposed legislation
before Congress in 1974, supported by the Commission, that would
have enacted a provision permitting issuers to selectively waive
privileges in disclosures to the Commission was ultimately not passed
by Congress. The concern was expressed that attorneys might disclose
information to the Commission in the belief that the evidentiary
privileges or that information were preserved, only to have a court
subsequently rule that the privilege was waived.
Id. (citations omitted). Ultimately, the Commission decided not to adopt the
rule because it was "mindful of concerns" that such disclosures to the
Commission might not be protected (despite the Commission's view that they
should be) and that such protection would serve the public interest. See id.
69. See Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 1, at 1307-08 (arguing
that, because the client does not know the law and will seek to avoid post-
Enron prosecution and regulatory action, ex ante communications are not
likely to be chilled); Stabile, supra note 1, at 34 (questioning the need for
confidentiality in the corporate context in part because "corporations have little
choice but to communicate with their attorneys, regardless of the privilege,
given the extent to which their activities involve legal issues and the costs of
not receiving necessary legal advice"); see also William H. Simon,
Perspective: Managerial Confidentiality is Overrated, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 2, 2003,
at 2 ("Despite these longstanding risks, agents continue to seek legal advice, in
part because there are compensating inducements to do so, and risks of not
doing so.... The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, by increasing the threat of both kinds of
liability [civil and criminal], will probably have a far greater effect in
encouraging legal consultation than any attorney-disclosure duty could have in
reducing it.").
Professor Stabile also suggests that because it lacks empirical support,
we ought to reject the proposition that the attorney-client privilege promotes
candor or legal compliance. See Stabile, supra note 1, at 45. However, as I
have argued previously, we cannot verify the effects of the privilege one way
or the other. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 129-32. Yet, a majority of
commentators and policy makers believe it does have a candor-inducing effect,
and few continue to argue that the privilege ought to be abandoned in the
corporate context or elsewhere.
70. See sources cited supra note 69.
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necessary. Corporate decision makers who want to comply with
securities laws may face a strong disincentive to promote full
communications with corporate attorneys regarding sensitive
matters, if those communications themselves might prejudice the
decision makers or the issuer in ongoing or future regulatory, civil,
or criminal proceedings. 71 Hence, the attorney-client privilege serves
an important buttressing function, reducing the disincentive to
communicate or facilitate communications with counsel on such
matters. Faced with the specter of potential adversaries taking
advantage of attorney-client communications, corporate decision
makers and counsel may discourage all but the most essential
communications in preparing securities disclosures.72
71. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 77. The fact that corporate decision makers
may want to comply with the law does not mean that they necessarily will act
to maximize communications between corporate actors and counsel. If
attorney-client communications were available to adversaries, issuers and their
decision makers might be (more) vulnerable to liability, sanctions, or
embarrassment, even if the decision makers seek ex ante to conform corporate
activities to the law. The desire to comply with legal requirements does not
preclude the possibility of a lawsuit or regulatory action. Compliance is
uncertain in complex regulatory contexts, many things can go wrong, and legal
challenges can emerge despite good faith efforts to adhere to legal
requirements. And, in an adversarial proceeding, attorney-client
communications may provide fodder for adversaries since they may contain
frank cost-benefit analyses regarding legal risks, discussions of past legal
mistakes or problems, expressions of doubts as to the appropriate course of
action, revelations of legal concerns, legal critiques of potential business
strategies, statements of displeasure with legal advice or the law, rejected
options for compliance that look superior in hindsight, and many other
sensitive matters. This prospect is enough to deter attorneys and decision
makers from having a full and detailed sharing of information and ideas,
despite the desire to comply with the law. Again, the SEC recognized this
when it ultimately removed its documentation requirement from the up-the-
ladder rules, in part out of a concern that the vulnerability of such documents
to disclosure in later judicial proceedings (given the uncertainty of the
privilege) could deter communications with counsel.
72. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 6, at 77-78 (discussing the benefits of the
corporate privilege and scholarship on the subject). This is consistent with the
fears expressed about the noisy withdrawal provision, see supra notes 18-26
and accompanying text. Again, in my view, a clearly articulated and narrowly
drawn withdrawal provision would not have a damaging impact. Indeed, clear
and narrowly drawn exceptions to privilege rules, like clear and narrowly
drawn exceptions to confidentiality rules, would not deter socially beneficial
corporate communications since lawyers and their clients would be able to
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Indeed, if protection of attorney-client confidences does not
have the potential to enhance compliance with the law, then perhaps
the up-the-ladder reporting and the proposed noisy withdrawal
requirements are far too easy on attorneys: corporate attorneys ought
to be treated like corporate managers and other gatekeepers, and
should have a duty to disclose various communications or potential
violations directly to the market or the SEC.73 Few advocate treating
attorneys exactly like other corporate actors, however, largely
because such treatment would be contrary to the predominant view-
now adopted explicitly by the SEC and implicitly endorsed by
Congress 7 4-that protecting attorney-client communications assists
in promoting issuer compliance with securities 
laws.75
assess at the time of the communication whether or not it is likely to be
protected. However, uncertain protections, and vague, malleable, or open-
ended exceptions or waiver doctrines foster unpredictability and, hence, may
chill decision maker efforts to facilitate communications with counsel.
73. Accountant-auditors, for example, are required to report illegal acts for
which senior management takes no remedial action to both the board of
directors and the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. 78j-l(b)(2)-(3) (2000). Of course,
broad attorney disclosure obligations would have a more direct and significant
impact on intra-corporate candor with attorneys than watered down or
uncertain privilege protections, given that disclosure resulting from the
absence of the privilege may be temporally distant and would not occur unless
the issuer is subject to information demands as part of a civil, criminal, or
administrative action. Thus, one could argue that initial protection of client
confidentiality is necessary to promote client candor while the privilege is not.
However, the risk of disclosure in later proceedings may chill many of the
communications initially protected by confidentiality rules. Thus, without
adequate privilege protection, one must question the utility of rules that
preserve client confidentiality (such as up-the-ladder provisions), particularly
in light of their immediate costs (e.g., denying the market or the SEC
immediate access to material information or information on wrongdoing).
Indeed, to my knowledge, no one who has participated in the debate over
Section 307 has argued that issuers should have no attorney-client privilege
protection.
74. See 148 CONG. REc. S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Enzi) (emphasizing the need to maintain attorney-client confidentiality and
distinguishing the obligations of attorneys from those of accountants). Indeed,
even in the initial letter of that spawned Section 307, forty professors
recognized that what lawyers would be obligated to do under an up-the-ladder
reporting regime would be substantially less demanding than the disclosure
obligation imposed on auditors by federal securities law. See Letters from
Several Professors, supra note 16. Thereafter, the letter suggested that
although some signatories believed that in certain circumstances a lawyer
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:597
But, again, this prevailing view appears premised on the
unspoken assumption that existing privilege protections are
sufficiently certain to promote (or avoid chilling) client
communications. This assumption is problematic. As I have argued,
existing uncertainties in privilege protections, if known to corporate
decision makers and their attorneys, would deter communications.76
Intra-issuer communications regarding securities matters are no
exception. The parameters of the corporate privilege are highly
uncertain.77 Moreover, because securities claims and enforcement
should be required to do more than report to the board of directors, others did
not because "lawyers and auditors have different roles in a representation." Id.
75. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1989) (stating that
the uncertainty of attorney-client privilege in the corporate context "threatens
to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's
compliance with the law"); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); see also Michael J. Riordan, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and the "Posthumous" Corporation-Should the
Privilege Apply?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 237, 247 (2003) (discussing the
justifications for the corporate privilege); Glynn, supra note 6, at 76-78
(discussing the differing views on the corporate privilege and defending the
privilege in the corporate context); Jack P. Friedman, Is the Garner
Qualification of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Viable After Jaffee v.
Redmond?, 55 Bus. LAW. 243, 245 (1999) ("The primary purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to encourage open, candid, and full communication
between client and lawyer. This serves the administration of justice by
enabling a lawyer to give legal advice based on knowledge of all of the facts
that prompted the client to seek legal counsel. The legal advice that a fully
informed lawyer gives to a client also facilitates compliance with the law. This
is especially relevant for corporations, which are subject to complex laws and
regulations." (citations omitted)). Again, no one advocates that all attorney-
client communications should receive absolute protection; for example, a
narrowly tailored crime-fraud exception to the privilege is largely beyond
dispute.
76. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 62, 74 ("Sufficient certainty or
predictability that [attorney-client] confidences will be protected from
disclosure is essential to promote, and avoid chilling, client candor .... If
either client or attorney has significant doubts about the communication's
protected status, each person will be less willing to engage in the
interchange.").
77. See Jossen, supra note 23, at 719 (comments of the Bar Association of
the City of New York) ("There is no uniform rule of attorney-client privilege
which is applicable in all jurisdictions, contexts and proceedings. Thus, the
imposition of a duty to report, coupled with the varying approaches to the
corporate attorney-client privilege taken by federal courts and the courts of the
fifty states, would result in uncertainty in the application of the attorney-client
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actions (state and federal) may be brought in a wide variety of state
and federal courts and in non-judicial fora, the uncertainty is only
enhanced.78
One example illustrates this point: some jurisdictions, including
the Fourth Circuit, still cling to the erroneous view that the client's
intent to disclose the final version of a document means that the
privilege never attaches, and hence, drafts of the document are not
privileged. 79 Also, whether and when such drafts are protected is
privilege, particularly in determining when, or if, the privilege has been
waived." (citation omitted)); see also Sarbanes-Oxley: Will It Destroy the In-
House Role?, LAWYER, Mar. 3, 2003, at 2 (indicating that much of the
uncertainty surrounding corporate privilege stems from the question of who the
in-house counsel represents: "the corporation, management, employees, or
shareholders... [o]r a government regulator such as the SEC or the civil
courts.").
78. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 provides as follows:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of
any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under
this subchapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 77 et seq.] and under the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and,
concurrent with State and Territorial courts... of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this subchapter. Any such suit or action may be brought in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place, if the
defendant participated therein, and process in such cases may be
served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000) (emphasis added); see also Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000) (explaining that for violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77,
"the Commission may, in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of
the United States ... to enjoin such acts or practices ... ." (emphasis added)).
79. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a document is privileged only if it contains information that is
intended to be kept confidential, regardless of whether it is subsequently
published or not); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 874-76 (4th
Cir. 1984) (holding that privilege is lost when a client expressly authorizes his
or her attorney to perform services that reflect intent to disclose the
information to third parties); see also PAUL R. RICE, AITrORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:13 (2d. ed. 1999) ("Despite the illogic
and inherent unfairness, many cases can be found in which courts summarily
deny the protection of the privilege to drafts of documents that are being
prepared by counsel for distribution to third parties."). These cases remain
precedent in the circuit, although the court has recently refused to extend their
approach to oral communications surrounding the preparation of a document.
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still unsettled in other jurisdictions.8 0 The Fourth Circuit's position
and the lack of clarity elsewhere has enormous implications in the
securities context.8 1 Reviewing and modifying drafts of registration
statements, press releases, periodic disclosures, and other documents
intended for publication to the market is what securities lawyers
do.82 The privilege will provide little protection for core aspects of
such legal services if adversaries have access to the underlying drafts
and corresponding changes. The fact that only a minority of
jurisdictions take the draconian view should provide little comfort,
given that issuers subject to federal disclosure requirements usually
sell securities on national exchanges and therefore may face state or
federal securities claims anywhere in the country.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 341 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2003). Other
courts have followed the Fourth Circuit's lead on drafts. See Fordham v.
Onesoft Corp., No. Civ. A. 00-1078-A, 2000 WL 33341416, at *3 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 6, 2000); Gordon v. Newspaper Ass'n of Am., No. LF-768-3, 2000 WL
140602, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 2000); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 618 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
80. See RICE, supra note 79, § 5:13 (discussing disparate approaches to
drafts and the confusion between the confidentiality of communications and
underlying information); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing
Confusion About Attorney Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents,
and the Source of the Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 967, 996-1002
(1999) (discussing the scope of waiver in the context of drafts of documents
prepared for release to third parties). Courts differ in their approaches to drafts
of documents. See Women's InterArt Ctr., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Econ. Dev., No. 03
Civ. 2732, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13878, at *11-* 12 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004)
(holding that drafts of letters retain their privilege only if they contain
confidential information); Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 174
F.R.D. 609, 633 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that drafts are privileged only if they
contain information that is not ultimately disclosed); see also In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2nd Cir. 1984) (noting that,
because privilege attaches to communication and not information, privilege
attaches to drafts unless it is waived); Alexander v. FBI, 198 F.R.D. 306, 312
(D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2000) ("Drafts of documents that are prepared with the
assistance of counsel for release to a third party are protected under attorney-
client privilege."); State ex rel. Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Arnoff LLP v.
City of Rossford, 746 N.E.2d 1139, 1144-45 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that only information contained in the drafts that is not subsequently disclosed
is privileged) (citing Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Group Sec., 841 F. Supp. 1423,
1428 (S.D. Tex. 1993)).
81. Supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 1, at 1302 (stating
that attorneys have a principal role in the drafting of disclosure documents).
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Thus, given that underlying privilege protections are highly
uncertain in the securities context, one must question whether the
privilege, in its current form, undermines compliance goals. Also, if
the privilege is not fundamentally reformed, privilege protections
continue to become even less certain, and counsel and clients gain a
greater awareness of the scope and depth of this uncertainty, then we
ought to reconsider whether exempting issuer attorneys from more
direct disclosure obligations is socially beneficial.
All of this-Sarbanes-Oxley and its regulatory progeny, the
corresponding emphasis on attorneys as gatekeepers, the uncertain
state of underlying privilege law, and the potential impact of this
uncertainty on gatekeeping-also provides three broader lessons
about the role of the attomey-client privilege and privilege reform.
First, although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC rules promulgated
thereunder do not purport to alter privilege doctrine, these reforms
and the surrounding debate highlight the central role of the
privilege.83  This is a healthy reminder that privilege doctrine is
inherently part of the fabric of not only the law governing lawyers,
but also the law in other areas, including that which governs
corporations. It also teaches that the question of whether and how to
reform the privilege must not be answered in a vacuum, without
reference to its direct effects on other areas of substantive regulation.
Second, Sarbanes-Oxley and the underlying regulations offer an
example of why there is a significant federal interest in ensuring that
the privilege law actually serves its purpose of enhancing legal
compliance. There is an obvious federal interest in ensuring the
integrity of securities markets. 84 In light of the failure of corporate
attorneys to prevent Enron and the other market debacles, Congress
rejected claims that the regulation of attorneys should remain within
the exclusive purview of individual state bars and judicial
83. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Practicing Before
the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2004) ("[A]n attorney does not reveal client
confidences or secrets or privileged or otherwise protected information related
to the attorney's representation of an issuer."); see also supra notes 27-41 and
accompanying text (discussing Congress' passage of Section 307 and the
SEC's response to the mandate for clearer standards of professionalism).
84. Compare Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 15, at 221 (referring to
securities law and corresponding practice as a realm of "unquestioned federal
supremacy").
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authorities. 85 Congress and the SEC have not gone that far with the
privilege specifically, but in their approach to facilitating legal
compliance, they have recognized the role the protection of client
confidences plays. 86 The privileged status of at least some of these
confidences is one of the building blocks upon which the new
87gatekeeping regime rests. Thus, it is a matter of federal concern
that the purposes of the privilege are threatened by the uncertainty of
underlying privilege protections.
Third, the foregoing lends further support to the claim that a
privilege crafted and controlled by the judiciary is inadequate. As an
initial matter, if the privilege is part of the fabric of corporate law
and of the regulatory backdrop that frames attorneys as gatekeepers
for the securities markets, then privilege doctrine should be
developed and enforced in light of these considerations. Judicial
decision makers, who develop privilege doctrine ex post in the
context of particular discovery disputes, are not in the best position
to engage in the careful balancing that is required. And the SEC is
85. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Enzi) ("I am usually in the camp that believes States should regulate
professionals within their jurisdiction. However, in this case, the State bars as a
whole have failed."). Some, including the ABA, argued that the regulation of
attorneys should be left to the states. See Letter from Robert E. Hirshon,
President, American Bar Association, to Senator John Edwards (June 20,
2002), http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/107th/business062002.html. Other
scholars agree with Congress that local regulation has not worked. See Panel
2: The Evolution of Corporate Governance, supra note 22, at 619-20
(comments of Professor Richard Painter) ("[Lawyers are] still very much self-
regulated compared with broker-dealers, accountants, and other professions.
But we are losing parts of that as we go along here, and I think we will
continue to do so if we don't hold organizations such as the American Bar
Association, such as our state and local bar associations, accountable to come
up with rules that make sense and avoid these types of problems in the
future."); see also Panel Two: The Evolution of Corporate Governance, supra
note 22, at 637 ("There is a real problem of fifty state bar associations trying to
regulate securities lawyers. It hasn't worked. We haven't had any disciplinary
cases against these big-firm lawyers. It's the same pattern we see with broker-
dealers, accountants, and every other gate-keeper profession-that self-
regulation is lost gradually as people abuse it."); Koniak, Corporate Fraud,
supra note 15, at 211-12 (arguing state regulation of attorneys and other kinds
of regulation have not worked).
86. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
Winter 2004] ONE PRIVILEGE TO RULE THEM ALL?
likely incapable of correcting judicial decisions that strike the wrong
balance, since it seems doubtful the agency has the authority to
abrogate or preempt federal or state privilege law.
88 Indeed, the
federal courts' disparate approaches to selective waiver have already
frustrated the SEC's efforts by deterring issuers from voluntarily
sharing privileged information with the agency, something the SEC
believes would benefit investors and the public.89 Finally, strong
historical evidence suggests that judicial control of privilege doctrine
has led to uncertainty, a result that is unsurprising, given thatjudicial
law making is piecemeal, relatively slow, and decentralized.
90 If an
uncertain privilege itself threatens to undermine attorneys' ability to
ensure legal compliance, and hence, the integrity of the securities
markets, then Congress has yet another reason for removing privilege
law-making from the judiciary.
88. The Commission indicated that its rules of professional conduct would
preempt conflicting state standards. 17 C.F.R. §205.1 (2004) ("Where the
standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction where an attorney is
admitted or practices conflict with this part, this part shall govern.").
However, its authority to do so has already been challenged. See Letter from
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., supra note 20 ("The Commission cannot itself establish
its authority to preempt state privilege rules. Only Congress can speak to
that."); see also Moser & Keller, supra note 27, at 845-47 (discussing state bar
association challenges to the SEC's authority to preempt conflicting state
professional rules of conduct). The Commission has all but conceded that it
currently cannot preempt or abrogate privilege law. See Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-
47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6312 (Feb. 6, 2003).
89. The SEC chose to withdraw one of its provisions addressing selective
waiver in part because it recognized that it may not have the authority to
preempt privilege law. See Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,
6312 (Feb. 6, 2003); supra note 68. In so doing, it emphasized the benefits of
selective waiver for investors. Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,
6312 (Feb. 6, 2003). The uncertainty of underlying privilege doctrine also was
an important factor in the SEC's decision to withdraw its documentation
requirement for up-the-ladder reporting, another provision which the SEC
believed offered potential benefits. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
90. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 98-121.
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B. Other Recent Developments Affecting the
Attorney-Client Privilege
A number of other recent developments shed light on the debate
over whether and how to reform the attorney-client privilege. Of
these, the DOJ's decision to allow monitoring of conversations
between terrorism suspects and their attorneys has received the most
attention. The new regulation authorizes Bureau of Prisons
personnel to monitor conversations between detainees and their
attorneys whenever the government has substantial reason to believe
that the conversations could facilitate violence or terrorism by
passing on information or instructions.
91
Although the new rule has its defenders, 92 most legal scholars
have criticized it as both unjustified and detrimental to the attorney-
client relationship. 93 Many of these scholars argue, despite DOJ
assurances to the contrary, that the potential for such monitoring
without judicial oversight will render privilege protections highly
uncertain, thereby chilling client and attorney candor and harming
the attorneys' ability to render legal advice.94 It is worth noting that,
absent an unlikely Supreme Court determination that this kind of
monitoring violates the Sixth Amendment, or some other kind of
national reform, state law enforcement officials may implement
similar practices, further weakening privilege protections in the
criminal context.
95
91. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)
(2004).
92. See Davis, supra note 3, at 189-90 (concluding that the procedural
safeguards of the regulations ensure that the regulations are both constitutional
and protective of the privilege); see also Dinh, supra note 3, at 404 (noting that
the limited scope of the regulations will prevent any abrogation of the
privilege).
93. See Rice & Saul, supra note 3, at 23-24 (noting that the Bureau of
Prisons regulations are too vague and will render the privilege more uncertain);
Cohn, supra note 3, at 1245; see also Kristen V. Cunningham & Jessica L.
Srader, The Post 9-11 War on Terrorism... What Does it Mean for the
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 4 Wyo. L. REv. 311, 327 (concluding that the
regulations give the Department of Justice unlimited discretion in monitoring
conversations and such unchecked discretion is contrary to the judicial
oversight deemed necessary by the United States Supreme Court).
94. See Rice & Saul, supra note 3, at 23-24.
95. Such a Supreme Court finding is unlikely in part because the Supreme
Court rarely takes privilege cases. In addition, whether the Sixth Amendment
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Also, while battles over the attorney-client privilege continue in
state and federal court litigation, there has been little movement
toward resolution of the many areas of conflict since Federalizing
Privilege was published. Importantly, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the attorney-client privilege directly since its 1998
decision in Swidler & Berlin v. United States
96 and therefore has not
assisted in promoting convergence.97  At the same time, courts
around the country have continued to take differing approaches to the
elements of the privilege, its exceptions, and the various waiver
doctrines. For example, the confidentiality requirement continues to
baffle in numerous ways, including the treatment of drafts discussed
above, 98 the privileged status of certain electronic 
communications, 99
and the scope of the joint defense or common 
interest doctrine.'00
guarantees some privilege protection is unresolved, as is whether this policy
would violate any such guarantee. See id.; Davis, supra note 3, at 189-90. Of
course, the justification for monitoring in the terrorism context can be extended
to or used in other contexts in which there is a potential threat to public safety.
96. 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client privilege survives
the death of the client).
97. Since Swidler, the Court has not addressed the attorney-client privilege
directly.
98. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
99. See Carl Pacini et. al., Accountants, Attorney-Client Privilege, and the
Kovel Rule: Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure Via Electronic
Communication, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 917 (2003) (noting that some courts
have outright refused to consider cellular phone conversation confidential,
while other Courts have suggested that when technological advancements in
cell phones result in a reasonable expectation of privacy such communication
may be considered confidential); RICE, supra note 79, § 5:20 (discussing
lingering issues with the maintenance of confidentiality when communicating
via electronic means, although noting that the privilege issues are often
resolved without reference to the confidentiality requirement); see also United
States v. Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577, 1583 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (not considering the
effects of technological advancements and concluding that communications via
cellular phones would not be protected under the privilege).
100. Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 236 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
recent surveys have shown that the federal circuits are not in agreement on the
joint defense or common interest doctrine); RICE, supra note 79, § 4:4
(discussing differing views on whether individual joint clients can waive
privilege protection without the consent of the other joint clients); George S.
Mahaffey Jr., Taking Aim at the Hydra: Why the "Allied-Party Doctrine"
Should Not Apply in Cases When the Government Declines to Intervene, 23
REV. LITIG. 629, 660 (2004) (stating that the common interest or allied-party
630 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:597
Further, there is continuing uncertainty over the distinction between
legal and non-legal advice, including the applicability of the
privilege to communications with in-house counsel.' 0 ' Courts
continue to articulate differing, sometimes amorphous standards for
determining the scope of the crime-fraud exception 0 2 and they
doctrine has yet to be recognized or clarified by the Supreme court, and has
engendered a good deal of confusion in the judiciary).
101. See Alexander C. Black, Annotation, What Corporate Communications
Are Entitled to Attorney-Client Privilege-Modern Cases, 27 A.L.R. 5TH 76,
99 (2004) ("[B]ecause in-house counsel are often intimately involved in the
corporation's business affairs, application of the privilege to their
communications poses particular concerns. Thus, some courts have concluded
that corporate communications involving in-house counsel require special
scrutiny as to whether the requirements of the privilege have been met."). For
example, some courts have applied the "primary purpose" test to determine
whether attorney-client communications are privileged. See N. Pacifica, LLC
v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("In general,
legal advice is implicated 'if the nonlegal aspects of the consultation are
integral to the legal assistance given and the legal assistance is the primary
purpose of the consultation."' (quoting RICE, supra note 79, § 7:3, at 39).
However, the Ninth Circuit has recently suggested that a "because of' standard
would apply in the work product context, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357
F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2004), and a lower federal court in the circuit extended this
test to determine whether advice is legal advice in the attorney-client privilege
context. See Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., No. C-02-1786JSW, 2004
WL 1878209, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004) ("The Court discerns no reason
why and neither of the parties has advanced any reason why, for purposes of
determining the discoverability of documents that have both a legal purpose
and a nonlegal purpose... the methodology in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
should not be applied to the attorney-client privilege."). That court stated
explicitly that this standard is more protective than the primary purpose test.
See id.
102. For a general discussion of the crime-fraud exception, see Glynn, supra
note 6, at 113-15; Kendall C. Dunson, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 231 (1996); see also Rambus,
Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280, 288 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting that
courts have expanded the crime-fraud exception beyond more traditional
examples of crime and fraud). For example, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court has articulated a very broad definition of the crime-fraud exception,
which includes any "other type of misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with
the basic premises of the adversary system." In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793,
812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of
Counsel: Eroding Confidentiality in Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L.
REv. 163, 191 (1999) (noting that the D.C. Circuit Court has expanded "crime"
to include such misconduct). Other courts have adopted a similarly expansive
approach; for example, in Rambus, 222 F.R.D. at 290, the court expanded the
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continue to disagree over whether the fiduciary duty exception first
articulated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger10 3 applies in non-derivative
shareholder actions. 104 And various waiver doctrines, including the
exception to include the spoliation of evidence. However, other courts seemly
take a narrower view of the exception. See United States v. McDonald, No.
01-CR- 1168, 2002 WL 31056622, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2002) (limiting the
scope of the exception by requiring the attorney to have the intent to further a
crime); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Massaro, No. CIV. A. 97-2022, 2000
WL 1176541, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2000) ("The crime-fraud exception does
not extend to tortious conduct generally, but is limited to communications to
and from an attorney in furtherance of a crime or fraud.").
103. 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970). The Garner court determined
in the context of a derivative shareholder action that "where the corporation is
in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder
interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of
the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of
the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular
instance." Id. It then articulated a non-exclusive nine-factor test for
determining whether plaintiff shareholders have established "good cause" to
pierce the privilege. Id. The factors are as follows: "the number of
shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent; the bona fides of the
shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously
colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the
information and the availability of it from other sources; whether, if the
shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action
criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; whether the
communication related to past or to prospective actions; whether the
communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself; the extent to which
the communication is identified versus the extent to which the shareholders are
blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information in
whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons."
Id. at 1104.
104. See, e.g., RMED Int'l, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., No. 94 Civ.
5587, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71, at *13-*16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2003)
(discussing the split in circuit authority on the issue and the fact that the
Second Circuit had yet to recognize the exception expressly, and deciding that
the exception does apply in the non-derivative context). The reach of the
fiduciary duty exception to other types of relationships likewise remains
unresolved. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 6, at 107-10 (discussing the
disagreements over and controversy surrounding the doctrine); Kenneth S.
Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial Privileges and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 786-87 (2002) (noting the
disparate treatment of the Garner exception across jurisdictions).
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selective waiver, subject matter waiver, and inadvertent disclosure
doctrines remain unsettled.'° 5
In addition to this continuing parade of doctrinal disagreements
within the courts, several recent developments further buttress my
contention that federal and state courts are no longer able to control
the privilege doctrine and its application. As argued in Federalizing
Privilege, the increasing number of matters that are adjudicated or
resolved in non-judicial settings, including arbitration and
administrative proceedings, exacerbates the uncertainty of privilege
protection. 106 Decision makers in these fora may not be bound to
uphold any particular aspect of privilege law, may have insufficient
105. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 79, § 9:28 (discussing selective waiver
through partial disclosure); Jody E. Okrzesik, Selective Waiver: Should the
Government Be Privy to Privileged Information Without Waiving the Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine?, 34 U. MEM. L. REv. 115, 120
(2003) (discussing the multiple approaches the circuit courts have taken to
selective waiver, including both its permission and disallowance and whether
selective waiver under a confidentiality agreement is valid); Thomas R.
Mulroy & Eric J. Munoz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1 DEPAUL
Bus. & COMM. L.J. 49, 65 (2002) (discussing whether there is waiver in the
context of internal corporate investigations). Courts continue to articulate and
apply differing tests to determine whether the privilege has been inadvertently
waived. Compare Murray v. Gemplus, Int'l, 217 F.R.D. 362, 366 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (applying a five factor test to determine if inadvertent disclosure results
in privilege waiver), with Chester County Hosp. v. Independence Blue Cross,
No. 02-2746, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25214, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7,
2003) (holding that when inadvertent disclosure occurs, "it is appropriate to
ask whether the circumstances surrounding the disclosure evidenced conscious
disregard of the possibility that an adversary might obtain the protected
materials" in determining if such disclosure waives the privilege); see also
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EvIDENCE §
202, at 401 (2d ed. 1994) ("Courts are divided on whether the attorney-client
privilege is lost by accidental or inadvertent disclosure."); RICE, supra note 79,
§ 9:70 (indicating that some courts refuse to find waiver when the privilege
holder has used reasonable efforts to protect confidentiality, while other courts
have rejected an inadvertence exception); Pacini et al., supra note 99 at 908-15
(discussing different approaches); John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary
Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure-Federal Law, 159 A.L.R. FED. 153
(2000) (discussing cases).
106. Glynn, supra note 6, at 126-32 (discussing the increasing number of
adversarial proceedings that are occurring outside of the traditional courtroom
setting, the largely unknown status of privilege protections in those
proceedings, the potentially insufficient expertise of non-judicial decision
makers in these settings and the limits on judicial review).
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expertise to engage in the difficult balancing of interests, and may be
largely immune from judicial or appellate oversight. 10 7  These
problems will arise more frequently as adjudications outside state
and federal courts increase. For example, the status of the privilege
in military tribunals, which are not bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, has recently received scholarly attention.0 8 And the role
of the privilege in enforcement proceedings before self-regulatory
organizations, including the New York Stock Exchange and other
private adjudicatory bodies, remains largely unsettled.
Yet, judicial control of the privilege may also be declining in
more traditional settings. For example, upstream law enforcement
and prosecutorial tactics can subvert the privilege and its purposes
despite supposed downstream judicial oversight. 10 9 Again, the new
rules allowing monitoring of terrorism suspects permits access to
what may otherwise be privileged attorney-client communications.
110
Although the DOJ has argued that the monitoring will not affect the
privilege because such conversations will not be admissible in a
criminal proceeding, the monitoring itself chills candor and
communication."' In addition, federal prosecutors more and more
frequently demand that corporate criminal defendants and principals
"voluntarily" waive their privilege protections in exchange for
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The USA-PATRIOT Act and the American
Response to Terror: Can We Protect Civil Liberties after September 11?, 39
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1509 (2002) (noting that without sensible guidelines
regulating communications in the military tribunal context "you're breaching
the privilege which is something that is very important"); Rice & Saul, supra
note 3, at 28 (discussing the uncertainty of the privilege in the military tribunal
context).
109. See Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's
Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why it is
Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv. 469, 515-83 (2003) (noting many recent federal
prosecutorial attempts at curtailing the attorney-client privilege including the
pressures to waive the privilege under corporate sentencing guidelines); Susan
W. Crump, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Other Ethical Issues in the
Corporate Context Where There is Widespread Fraud or Criminal Conduct, 45
S. TEX. L. REv. 171, 175-89 (2003) (noting a variety of pressures in-house
counsel faces to waive the privilege).
110. See Rice & Saul, supra note 3, at 23-24.
111. See Cunningham & Srader, supra note 93, at 325 (noting that
monitoring of conversations will stifle communications, regardless of the
procedural safeguards); Rice & Saul, supra note 3, at 23.
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various kinds of more favorable treatment (e.g., in charging and
sentencing) based on cooperation. 112 While such waivers may seem
socially beneficial in particular cases, a standard practice of
demanding waivers in white collar criminal investigations-
combined with high settlement or plea bargain rates-would all but
eviscerate any apparent protection the privilege may provide."
13
Again, courts may have some ability to check such waiver demands,
but, as a practical matter, this oversight is extremely limited.
Furthermore, at this point, nothing is preventing state prosecutors
from applying similar pressures in their criminal matters."
4
112. See Cole, supra note 109, at 540 (noting how prosecutors may lessen a
corporation's culpability if the privilege is waived); David M. Zornow & Keith
D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in
Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 154 (2000)
("[F]ederal prosecutors more and more frequently go so far as to state that
unless a company provides its privileged information to the government, the
company will be deemed not to have cooperated."); see also Memorandum
from the Deputy Attorney General of the United States of America, to All
Component Heads and United States Attorneys, Part II.A.4 (June 16, 1999)
(stating that the factors to be considered in determining whether to charge a
corporation include, inter alia, the corporation's "timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation
of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-
client and work product privileges" (emphasis added)), http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraudlpolicy/Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].
113. See Molly McDonough, A Tell-All Approach: Opening Corporate
Investigations Fosters Credibility with the Feds, 90 A.B.A. J. 24 (2004)
(discussing arguments why pressure "to waive privilege is likely to make
clients less candid if they believe their lawyers will turn into agents of the
government"); Cole, supra note 109, at 543-44 ("Of particular concern is the
potential for prosecutors to intrude unnecessarily into the attorney-client
relationship and frustrate the important policy objectives that underlie the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Unfortunately, the
approach to evaluating cooperation and voluntary disclosure that is set forth in
the Holder Memorandum does not reflect appropriate sensitivity to privilege
issues."). This practice is particularly problematic in the early stages of an
investigation, before charges or an indictment are imminent. It also may have
ripple effects, since the sharing of information with government officials may
waive the privilege in other proceedings. See supra note 68 (discussing the
split in authority on the issue of selective waiver).
114. Benedict P. Kuehne, Protecting the Privilege in the Corporate Setting:
Conducting and Defending Internal Corporate Investigations, 9 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 651, 652-53 (1997) ("In recent years, corporations and business
organizations have been frequent targets of criminal investigations at both the
state and federal levels.... The 1990s may well be remembered as the decade
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The attorney-client privilege, therefore, may be even more
uncertain than it was a few years ago. And the sources of this
uncertainty are widespread: intrajurisdictional confusion,
interjurisdictional conflict, and extrajudicial decisions and pressures
all contribute to the problem. The privilege provides some
protection, but this protection is highly unpredictable.
The securities context again provides a useful illustration.
Whether the privilege will protect issuer-attorney communications in
an adversarial proceeding may depend on multiple factors, including:
the jurisdiction in which the matter is brought, whether the matter is
adjudicated in a judicial or nonjudicial forum, the jurisdiction's
treatment of drafts, the court's treatment of communications with in-
house counsel, the court's view of the scope of the corporate
privilege, the judge's application of the Garner exception discussed
below, and whether the matter could spawn a criminal inquiry
inviting heavy-handed prosecutorial tactics. Further, the risk of a
tainting disclosure is multiplied, given that securities litigation is
often complex, involving multiple matters in multiple fora. In light of
all of this, the reasonably informed attorney or corporate decision
maker assessing the risk of disclosure at the time of the
communication might be well-advised to assume that any given
communication may not be protected.
Despite this enormous uncertainty, the risk of ultimate
disclosure of client confidences is limited by other variables. For
example, in the transactional context, the risk of an adverse privilege
determination leading to disclosure is reduced by the fact that the
content of the client confidences may never be the subject of a suit,
prosecution, or administrative inquiry. 115 In addition, constitutional
concerns may chill prosecutorial overstepping in some
circumstances, 16 and the norms of legal practice may temper zealous
when traditional business practices came to be viewed with suspicion by law
enforcement agencies." (emphasis added)).
115. Of course, the risk of an adversarial proceeding or regulatory action will
vary by industry and area of regulation. In heavily regulated and litigated
areas, including securities, it is more probable that there will be a future
proceeding in which communications are sought.
116. The Sixth Amendment provides a potential limitation on prosecutorial
conduct. However, whether and to what extent the Amendment protects
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pursuit of potentially privileged communications in both judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. Furthermore, client tolerances for
disclosure risk vary.'
17
Nevertheless, if the privilege is to enhance social utility
optimally, its protections must be certain enough to provide some
confidence at the time of the attorney-client communication
regarding whether disclosure of the content of the discussion will be
compelled 1 8 and, correspondingly, some confidence that the
communications themselves will not make the client more vulnerable
to civil, criminal, or administrative liability.
119
Perhaps most attorneys, individual clients, and corporate
decision makers continue to have such confidence. Indeed, attorneys
and their clients have not stopped communicating altogether and
many seem to assume their communications will remain confidential.
Yet, at least in many contexts, such confidence appears largely based
on a misperception of the risk.120 We do not, and cannot, know the
attorney-client confidentiality and the privilege remains unresolved. See supra
note 95.
117. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 82.
118. See id. at 82-85.
119. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6307 (noting
the concern that a documentation requirement related to up-the-ladder
reporting might create a "treasure trove" of potentially discoverable material
given the uncertainty of the privilege, and hence, might deter communications
because issuers would face increased vulnerability); see also supra note 71
(discussing such vulnerability). This does not mean that all attorney-client
communications should be protected. If appropriately defined in advance, the
crime-fraud exception and other exceptions can address socially harmful
client-attorney communications without eviscerating reasonable certainty
regarding privilege protections.
120. I am not suggesting that attorneys or their clients are suffering from
some kind of collective denial, or that attorneys are incapable of assessing risks
or understanding the nuances of privilege doctrine. I am arguing, nevertheless,
that attorneys and their clients generally assume that the privilege is more
protective than it is. Indeed, this may be the most useful finding running
through the limited attempts to determine empirically the effects of the
privilege. See Glyrn, supra note 6, at 80-81 (discussing various surveys of
attorneys, clients, and corporate personnel). In my discussions with practicing
attorneys, I have found that perceptions of the privilege are consistent with
these studies. In fact, most attorneys with whom I discuss these matters are
shocked by the various limitations and exceptions to privilege protection and
the overall amount of uncertainty in the doctrine. A possible explanation for
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extent to which existing uncertainties have already chilled attorney-
client candor.12 ' Going forward, we should not assume such
misperceptions will endure, nor should the social benefits of
the privilege depend on them. 122 There is also no guarantee mis-
perceptions will always flow in the direction of overvaluing the
privilege's protections; the uncertainties of the privilege, in
combination, may foster an impression that the privilege offers little
or no protection. 23
Thus, as I argued in Federalizing Privilege, the existing
situation is intolerable. 124 Perfect certainty is not achievable, nor is it
necessary. The existing regime falls far short of even providing
reasonable certainty, however. A base level of predictability that,
over time, is necessary to enhance attorney-client communications,
would reap the benefits of the privilege.
this misperception is that the sources of the uncertainty-both substantive and
structural-are sufficiently disparate that it takes a fair amount of study to
understand its scope and depth. It may be that only those attorneys and
scholars who deal with privilege issues thoroughly or regularly develop a sense
of the whole. Perhaps in other circumstances attorneys may realize how
tenuous privilege protections are, but they choose, despite the risks of ultimate
disclosure, not to share the full extent of their concerns with their clients out of
a fear that the clients will stop communicating with them.
121. Again, there is no empirical evidence proving the effects of various
factors on attorney-client privilege. The difficulty in conducting such a
study, together with the fact that it is virtually impossible to collect data on
confidential communications, accounts for the lack of data. See Glynn, supra
note 6, at 71-73, 79-80.
122. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 85.
123. Indeed, the uncertainty of the privilege may have a bigger (even
inflated) impact if the threat of regulatory, civil, or criminal inquiries that may
lead to disclosures appears high. Given the attention Sarbanes-Oxley and a
number of high-profile cases have received, such an appearance may currently
exist in the securities context. In addition, overdeterrence may result from an
attorney or a client being caught off guard when communications they thought
were privileged turned out to be unprotected.
124. Glynn, supra note 6, at 62 ("Indeed, an uncertain privilege offers
nothing but harm: it inhibits access to the truth and creates enormous
transaction costs while failing to enhance attorney-client communication and
candor. Thus, today's highly uncertain privilege is intolerable.").
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II. APPROACHES TO ATITORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE REFORM
We must consider fundamental reform if, as I have contended,
the attorney-client privilege is so uncertain that its very purposes are
threatened. Yet, that is only a starting point-the need for reform
invariably raises the question of the appropriate means of crafting
and declaring privilege doctrine. Since the initial debates over the
Federal Rules of Evidence in the early 1970s, 125 the choice, at least at
the national level, has been framed as one of codification versus
common law. There is a range of choices on multiple axes, however.
Thus, for example, reform at the federal level may come in the form
of preemptive legislation, legislation that codifies federal attorney-
client privilege law but does not preempt state law, or "judicial"
codification of privilege law through the Advisory Committee
process. Of course, there is also the possibility of no codification-
which leaves intact the existing common-law regime-and seeking
reform on a case-by-case basis. In addition, a code may set forth a
detailed and exclusive set of rules outlining the elements of the
privilege, privilege exceptions, and waiver doctrines, or it may set
forth merely broad guiding principles and definitions, leaving to
courts (explicitly or implicitly) the authority to fill in gaps or to
"add" exceptions. Moreover, substantive privilege doctrine-
whether codified or common law-may be supplemented by other
reforms aimed at increasing predictability, such as a national choice-
of-law rule or an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act 12 6 that
extends privileges to arbitration proceedings and/or enhancing
judicial oversight of privilege determinations in these proceedings.
No approach to reform is perfect, and each offers its own mix of
benefits and costs or risks. On balance, however, leaving the current,
largely common-law regime intact, and simply seeking reform on a
case-by-case or jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis is the least
125. The draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence contained provisions
governing attorney-client privilege and precluding common-law development
of the doctrine. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1973). Although there was support for
those provisions, there was also adamant opposition that ultimately led to their
demise. The opposition included commentary and testimony by members of
both the judiciary and the subcommittee. See Broun, supra note 104, at 772-
79.
126. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
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attractive option, offering little potential for short or long-term
improvement. 127 Indeed, the recent developments described above
demonstrate further the inadequacy of a court-centered, common-law
attorney-client privilege. Some form of codification, therefore, is
needed. Among the possibilities, the best option remains preemptive
federal privilege legislation that provides a single, clear, and
unqualified set of privilege protections applicable in state and
federal, and judicial and nonjudicial proceedings. Federal
codification without preemption is the next best option, although its
overall effectiveness will depend on a variety of factors.
A. The First Inquiry: Is the Shift to a Codified
Privilege Appropriate?
In the federal system, the starting point for any discussion
regarding privilege reform is whether the existing common-law
approach ought to be replaced by a codified privilege. As I argued in
Federalizing Privilege, the prevailing common-law regime, in the
federal courts and many states,' 28 is a central factor contributing to
the current uncertainty. 129 Without retracing my entire argument, it
is worth repeating that the common-law method is structurally ill-
equipped in the modem age to produce clear and predictable
privilege protections that strike the right balance between the
extrinsic values the privilege serves and the intrinsic costs of the
privilege to the truth-seeking process. 130 Judicial decision-making
regarding the privilege is decentralized, post hoc, case-specific, slow,
and subject to limited appellate oversight. Conflicting approaches,
limited doctrinal guidance, and case-specific qualifications are likely
to emerge and remain in such a system. This claim is supported by
127. See, e.g., Broun, supra note 104, at 780 ("[T]he courts have, with
characteristic caution, moved the law forward-slowly. However, given the
reality of acting only on a case-by-case basis, whether they have moved the
law with sufficient completeness, alacrity or certainty is another question.").
128. These include not only pure common-law systems, but also states that
have "codified privileges" offering little or no detail on elements, exceptions,
and waiver doctrines. For example, New York has a statute that recognizes the
privilege, but provides no details. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (Consol. 2002).
129. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 62 (describing how Congress left the
development of privilege to the courts when it chose not to adopt privilege
doctrine into the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975).
130. See id. at 136-42.
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the privilege's modem history and the recent developments described
above.' 3 ' This inherently court-centered approach to the privilege
also does not address the status of the doctrine in the growing body
of extra-judicial proceedings. Nor has it served as a meaningful
check against external forces, including increasingly aggressive law
enforcement and prosecutorial tactics, which apply pressure on the
privilege. Given all of this, I believe there is little hope that
significant, meaningful reform can be achieved through judicial
decision making.
Nevertheless, the common-law method is not without its
defenders. Professor Rice, for example, argues forcefully that the
common-law approach is superior to codification. 132 Many of his
concerns about codification relate specifically to the Advisory
Committee process, some of which I will touch on below. 3 3 Yet, he
also argues that the common law is superior codification because the
"vital and dynamic" common-law process allows for flexibility and
change, facilitating beneficial developments in privilege doctrine.
134
He cites to the recognition and growth of the "fiduciary duty," or
"Garner" exception, 135 as an example of a positive development that
would not have occurred under a rules-based system. 13  Indeed, he
131. Moreover, to date, court-made choice-of-law determinations in cases
where two or more conflicting privilege doctrines may apply have only
exacerbated the problem. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 121-25.
132. Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Tending to the Past and Pretending for the Future? 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 836
(2002); see also Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality
Necessary? 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 479 (2002) ("The bar should defer
to the courts in establishing disclosure standards for client information on a
case by case basis under the evidentiary attorney-client privilege.").
133. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
134. Rice, supra note 132, at 836 ("Why should we relegate privilege rules
that are currently vital and dynamic to the [Advisory] Committee's relatively
stagnated process? Under common-law principles, a number of new privileges
have been recognized and established privileges have continued to evolve.").
135. See supra note 103.
136. Rice, supra note 132, at 838 (noting that the Garner court was able to
create this exception because Rule 501 allows privilege doctrine to be
developed through the common-law method).
Uniformity is not an end in itself. It is desirable only if it does not
sacrifice long-term benefits-including evolution of the law-that
flow from open and continuous debate.... I fear that codification will
come at the expense of the developments we are currently witnessing.
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notes that the California Supreme Court refused to recognize this
exception solely because, in codifying the privilege, the state
legislature had not recognized the exception and had made
recognition of new exceptions a legislative prerogative.' 37 Professor
Rice's concern that codification would stifle beneficial development
is consistent with those expressed by other scholars who have
cautioned that codification would inappropriately "freeze" privilege
doctrine. 1
38
I agree that there have been some beneficial developments in
privilege doctrine since the 1970s. It is also true that a federal
codification that provides a detailed set of rules not subject to
judicial modification would largely freeze privilege doctrine, would
be slow to respond to calls for reform, and might inhibit useful
doctrinal developments.' 39  Indeed, my proposal for a single,
preemptive codification of privilege doctrine might cause even
greater stagnation than less ambitious proposals, since even state
courts and legislatures would no longer be free to create or alter
privilege doctrine.
The current regime's potential for producing beneficial growth
is outweighed by its costs, however. These include both enormous
transaction costs and significant uncertainty that endangers the very
purposes the privilege is supposed to serve.140 Moreover, while the
It may translate into little more than trading uniformity for the rich
public debate we have experienced under Rule 501.
Id. at 836.
137. Id. at 838 ("The court in Dickerson [v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. Rptr.
97, 100 (Ct. App. 1982)) acknowledged the wisdom of the federal fiduciary
duty exception, but refused to adopt it because the California legislature had
not recognized it.").
138. See Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That is the
Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58
BROOK. L. REv. 641, 684-87 (1992) (noting that opponents of codification
have argued that such action would make the privilege too inflexible); see also
Glynn, supra note 6, at 144-45 (addressing this argument).
139. I should also note that I do not take Professor Rice's concerns regarding
codification lightly, since he has an enormous amount of expertise in this area.
There is also much on which he and I agree, although we differ on the merits
of codification and may not place the same value on the corporate privilege.
140. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 62 ("Indeed, an uncertain privilege offers
nothing but harm: it inhibits access to the truth and creates enormous
transaction costs while failing to enhance attorney-client communication and
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common law is not frozen, it is paralyzed-that is, incapable of
overcoming the systemic limitations described above that prevent
convergence or other means of achieving greater certainty. Indeed,
the federal judiciary has shown itself to be largely incapable of
responding to problems in privilege doctrine and application in either
a timely or adequate manner. Almost thirty years after Congress
enacted Rule 501, the Supreme Court has resolved few doctrinal
conflicts, and conflicts and confusion remain over core issues,
including the confidentiality requirement, the scope of the corporate
privilege, the crime-fraud exception, and the parameters of various
waiver doctrines.141 This is true even in some of the rare
circumstances in which the Supreme Court has addressed the
privilege, such as Upjohn Co. v. United States,142 where the Court
rejected the "control group" approach, but explicitly refused to
provide a general rule for determining which employee
communications to corporate counsel are privileged.
143
Moreover, although I agree the fiduciary exception is
appropriate in some circumstances, application of Garner in the
corporate context raises concerns similar to those I discussed with
regard to Sarbanes-Oxley. First, the scope of the exception remains
unresolved. 144 Further, the underlying issue Garner addresses in the
corporate setting is whether and when plaintiff shareholders may
claim that they, rather than corporate management, ought to control
the corporation, and hence, the privilege the corporation owns (such
that they may gain access to privileged corporate
candor."); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("If
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to
be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little
better than no privilege at all.").
141. Indeed, given this history, I am not at all convinced that judicial
resolutions to doctrinal questions arrive any faster than legislative ones.
142. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
143. See id. at 396-97.
144. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 107-10 (discussing the disagreements over
and controversy surrounding the doctrine); see also Broun, supra note 104, at
786-87 (noting the disparate treatment of the Garner exception across
jurisdictions); see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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communications). 145  That issue-like the question of how to
facilitate attorney gatekeeping in the securities context and that of the
proper scope of the corporate privilege in Upjohn-lies at the
intersection of privilege doctrine and corporate law. 146 Again, given
the complex mixture of interests at stake, leaving the resolution to
judges acting ex post in response to individual discovery disputes is
likely to produce not only inconsistent decisions, but also outcomes
that may be contrary to other regulatory ends.
For example, some federal courts have found that the Garner
exception applies in cases involving securities claims brought by
individuals on their own behalf. 147  This extension of Garner is
conceptually flawed. 148 Worse, if shareholders bringing securities
145. It is axiomatic that those acting on behalf of the corporation owe
fiduciary duties to the corporate entity, not directly to its shareholders. See
Friedman, supra note 75, at 272-73; see, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985). Thus, shareholders cannot
simply claim that they are directly owed fiduciary duties or that they are
entitled to all corporate communications. Rather, they must demonstrate that
there are reasons why they, instead of corporate management, are entitled to
act on behalf of the entity. See id. at 348 & n.4 (stating that the power to
control waiver of the privilege ordinarily lies with managers because they are
ones given that authority under state corporate law). Those entitled to control
the corporation at a given time control its privilege. See, e.g., id. at 348-49
(stating that the power to control the corporation lies with those who, at the
time of the waiver, control the corporation).
146. Indeed, control of corporate activities goes to the heart of corporate law,
and the inquiry regarding when shareholders are entitled to take the reins of the
corporation from the directors, who otherwise have the right to manage the
affairs of the corporation, is not an easy one.
147. See Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1992); Ward v.
Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1988); RMED Int'l, Inc. v.
Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., No 94 Civ. 5587, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2003); Baimco Corp. Sec. Litig. v. Keene Corp., 148
F.R.D. 91, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Other courts have refused to extend the
exception in the corporate context beyond derivative suits. See, e.g., Weil v.
Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., 647 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that a shareholder acting in an individual capacity may not use the
Garner exception); see also Friedman, supra note 75, at 249-56 (discussing
the split in authority).
148. Non-derivative claims-those brought by individual shareholders
seeking individualized relief-do not seek enforcement of claims on behalf of
the corporation-and management does not owe fiduciary duties directly to
individual shareholders. Shareholders in these suits therefore should not be
able to take advantage of a doctrine that purports to limit the privilege based on
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claims may utilize Garner to overcome the attorney-client privilege
simply upon showing "good cause"--a fungible concept subject to
the discretion of a particular judge-then the privilege provides little
assurance of protection in the securities context. 149 Although this
a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Weil, 647 F.2d at 23; Robert R.
Summerhays, The Problematic Expansion of the Garner v. Wolfinbarger
Exception to the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 TULSA L.J. 275, 308
(1995) ("However, where the plaintiff shareholders seek to recover
individually, as in lOb-5 actions, there appears to be little justification for
elevating their interests above those of non-plaintiff shareholders.").
149. The "good cause" standard has been criticized as harming predictability
of the corporate privilege. See Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D.
389, 390-92 (D. Conn. 1986) (stating that the doctrine "[is] ill-defined in
origin and has been troublesome in application."); Friedman, supra note 75, at
263. Further, I have already discussed why post hoc qualifications and
balancing tests are problematic. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 147-48.
That said, this exception may not be that troublesome in a derivative
action, because shareholder claims to privileged communications would only
arise after the shareholders has otherwise shown that they are entitled to "step
into the shoes" of the board of directors, a demonstration that is rather onerous,
usually requiring significant failures on the part of the board. See, e.g.,
Friedman, supra note 75, at 274-80 (discussing derivative suit procedures and
the right of shareholders to control the litigation upon overcoming these
hurdles).
But the same cannot be said for securuties claims. The operation of the
"good cause" test in securities cases creates enormous uncertainty. In this
context, there are no derivative suit hurdles to overcome, and the allegedly
inadequate or fraudulent disclosures necessarily would have already occurred.
Moreover, given the multi-factored "good cause" test Garner articulates, it
seems that the test is either highly unpredictable or would be relatively easy to
satisfy most of the time. For one thing, several of the factors (i.e. whether the
communication relates to past actions, whether the advice relates to the
litigation itself, and whether the communications are identified) will almost
always point to disclosure when ex ante attorney-client communications
regarding securities matters are sought. See supra note 103 (stating the
factors). These factors, combined with a non-frivolous securities claim and a
showing of potential relevance are enough to demonstrate good cause, at least
according to a recent case in the Southern District of New York. See RMED,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71, at * 15-*20 (finding the privilege should be pierced
because several factors pointed toward disclosure including the "most
important" factor, plaintiffs' need for the information, which was satisfied by a
showing of relevance to the elements of the claims). If this is so, then there is
little or no privilege protection for ex ante communications regarding corporate
disclosures. As long as plaintiffs have a meritorious claim and can identify
potentially relevant communications from the privilege log, they are likely to
gain access to the communications.
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sounds protective of shareholder interests,' 50 the real interests of the
shareholder are at risk if one accepts the (prevailing) view that
protecting issuer-attorney confidences facilitates compliance with
securities laws, and, hence, furthers shareholder interests ex ante by
increasing the probability of adequate disclosures. 151 Moreover, the
justification for this risk is made more suspect when one considers
that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege already
150. Our securities regime could be structured such that anytime
shareholders offer some evidence that there has been wrongdoing, they would
be entitled, ex post, to gain access to issuer communications with counsel.
This would be the correct approach if one believes that the corporate privilege,
which would preclude such access, does not promote candor or compliance
with the law. See Paul R. Rice, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Loss
of Predictability Does Not Justify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55 Bus. LAW. 735, 741
(2000) (expressing doubts about the utility of the corporate privilege). Yet,
this is contrary to the prevailing view, now shared by Congress and the SEC,
that, when combined with other constraints and incentives, the corporate
privilege can promote greater candor and communication with corporate
counsel, and accordingly, compliance with the law. See supra notes 10-13 and
accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. Indeed, the SEC has
explicitly emphasized the benefits to shareholders privilege protections may
provide. See, e.g., Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306-07,
6312 (Feb. 6, 2003). In determining how to further shareholder interests from
the securities prospective, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
This is made apparent by Enron and a number of the other recent collapses, in
which corporate failures precluded substantial recovery for defrauded
investors. Even when the defendant remains solvent or insurance is available,
investors rarely receive full compensation in securities cases. Obviously, civil
and criminal liability for securities violations, along with other sanctions, serve
a critically important deterrence function, see supra notes 60, 123, but
litigation rarely leads to full recovery for shareholder losses. This does not
mean that the protection the privilege provides is costless for shareholders,
although the actual social costs of the privilege, like its social benefits, are
impossible to establish empirically and there are other significant limits on
privilege protections, such as the crime-fraud exception, that will limit these
costs. But the limited financial benefit of ex post litigation for shareholders is
something to consider when balancing the costs of more certain or more
vigorous privilege protection against the privilege's potential compliance-
promoting effects. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6312 (Feb.
6, 2003) (suggesting that private securities litigants would benefit from a
selective waiver doctrine that allows the SEC to view privileged issuer
communications, but retains its privileged status against other, private parties).
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makes available to shareholder plaintiffs issuer-attomey
communications that the court finds (in camera) were made for the
purpose of furthering a crime or fraud.152 Likewise, this extension of
Garner is inconsistent with the balance Sarbanes-Oxley and its
regulatory progeny strike between closer regulation of insider and
attorney conduct and preserving issuer-attorney confidentiality.
153
The common-law approach therefore has produced a potentially
useful limitation in the fiduciary duty exception, but it has also
spawned and failed to correct harmful extensions of the doctrine.
As a result of the lack of leadership and lack of clarity in the
current regime, individual decision makers (judicial and nonjudicial)
are often free to pick and choose among conflicting and undefined
doctrines. This reduces the privilege to an ad hoc balancing of
152. The court will conduct such an in camera review if the shareholder
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the corporate decision makers
sought the attorney's legal advice or assistance for the purpose of furthering a
crime or fraud. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572-73 (1989). To
make the prima facie showing, the plaintiff must present a factual basis
adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that an in
camera review may reveal evidence that the exception applies. See id. at 572.
Although the scope of the crime-fraud exception and its application are
unclear, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, no one disputes the utility
of narrowly drawn crime-fraud exception. At least in the securities context,
the court's inquiry will be focused on discerning specific wrongful purposes
and, hence, more predictable than an unwieldy "good cause" inquiry. Indeed,
the privilege-limiting effects of the crime-fraud exception distinguish securities
fraud cases from derivative actions, since derivative actions may be premised
on various breaches of duties that do not involve allegedly fraudulent or
criminal activities.
153. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. Obviously, the
protection of shareholders is the purpose of securities regulation and the
impetus for recent reform, including Section 307. Yet, as Senators Edwards,
Enzi, and Corzine each indicated, that purpose would be best achieved through
a system by which issuer counsel was required to report failures of insider
wrongdoing to independent directors, who are supposed to protect
shareholders. See 148 CONG. REc. S6552, S6555-56 (daily ed. July 10, 2002).
As I indicated, more reform is needed to protect shareholders, including greater
assurances of director independence and more biting sanctions for insider and
attorney misconduct. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. And, of
course, courts should enforce important limitations on the privilege, including
the crime-fraud exception. However, a meaningful privilege should accompany
the new reforms to ensure corporate decision makers are not deterred from
keeping counsel fully informed.
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interests in particular cases, which eviscerates predictability and
offers little assurance of correct or socially beneficial outcomes.
154
For these reasons, clarifying and then freezing most aspects of the
privilege is desirable, even if some beneficial developments are
inhibited, as long as the codified rules are sufficiently detailed and
generally strike the right balance between promoting attorney-client
candor and other countervailing interests.
Of course, some (perhaps many) doubt that legislative or judicial
rule-making bodies, Congress or the Advisory Committee, can draft
a sufficiently clear and detailed set of privilege rules or produce a
code that strikes the right balance between providing too much or too
little protection. Although no code would be entirely free from
ambiguity, privilege protections need not be absolutely clear. They
simply need to be clear enough for attorneys and their clients to
make reasonable assessments at the time of communication. I have
little doubt that the Advisory Committee, if it decides to do so, could
craft an attorney-client privilege code that would resolve and clarify
most of the privilege's elements, exceptions, and waiver doctrines.
Congress now has the resources to do the same. 155
More troubling, however, is the question of whether a legislative
or quasi-legislative process is likely to produce the right substantive
outcome. Many may hesitate to endorse codification for fear that
special interests opposed to their views of the privilege would
influence the outcome, and that this outcome would then be "frozen"
into the law indefinitely. Professor Rice, for example, has criticized
the Advisory Committee's rule-making process as lacking openness
and being subject to undue influence by special interests.
15 6
I agree with Professor Rice that, if the Advisory Committee
engages in the drafting of a privilege code, it should adopt a more
open process. Yet, no matter what process the Advisory Committee
might employ, any judicial codification of the attorney-client
privilege will have to survive congressional review. The Supreme
154. The privilege's ends, and the corresponding need for certainty,
distinguish the privilege from most other rules of evidence. Thus, the
arguments here, which address only the attorney-client privilege, may not
apply with equal force to other rules of evidence.
155. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 153-54.
156. Rice, supra note 132, at 832-33, 839-40.
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Court, and hence, the Advisory Committee, has no authority to
promulgate privilege rules, because Congress has reserved that
power for itself. 157 Since Congress will have the final say as to the
content of a privilege code, the risk regarding possible outcomes
largely depends on an assessment of whether Congress, rather than
the Advisory Committee acting independently, is likely to get it
right.
If Congress attempts to codify attorney-client privilege law,
greater access is assured, but the outcome obviously is not. Special
interests no doubt will seek to influence the legislation, and I too
view the legislative process with healthy skepticism. In Federalizing
Privilege, I contended nevertheless, that there is a good chance that
Congress may enact appropriately measured privilege legislation
because of a rare balance of highly interested, cross-cutting, and
influential constituencies. 158 Recent events may support this claim:
although I do not want to overstate the case, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's treatment of attorneys-and its underlying confidentiality and
privilege implications-provides some indication of Congress's
ability to strike the right balance. 59  Legal organizations and
corporate interests initially opposed inclusion of any provision
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000) ("Any such rule creating, abolishing, or
modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless
approved by Act of Congress."). Congress could amend the Rules Enabling
Act ("REA") and authorize the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate
such rules. That seems unlikely, however, unless Congress has a sense of what
the outcome will be. This is also unlikely since members of Congress will hear
from active constituencies, including legal groups and other interested parties.
Moreover, if Congress amends the REA to allow the Supreme Court to
promulgate privilege rules along with other rules of evidence, Congress will
still be able to object, preventing the new rules from becoming final. See id. §
2074(a) (delineating the procedure for delivering proposed rules for
congressional approval).
158. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 154 (contending that while entities such as
well-organized industry groups will advocate for broader privilege protections,
constituencies such as law enforcement officials will seek to limit privilege
protections, thereby balancing the pressures exerted on Congress). I make this
claim as one who believes the privilege is socially beneficial, but should be
narrowly tailored in both the civil and criminal (and corporate and individual)
contexts to achieve its ends. Thus, for example, I favor a robust (but clear and
finite) crime-fraud exception, an appropriately tailored fiduciary duty
exception, and a balanced subject matter waiver doctrine.
159. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
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governing the conduct of lawyers,' 6° and the SEC initially did not
respond to calls for regulation of lawyer conduct.161 Yet, convinced
by those pressing for corporate reform, Congress included such a
provision. 162 On the other hand, Congress demonstrated its
sensitivity to confidentiality and privilege concerns by adopting
Section 307 instead of a provision that would treat attorneys
identically to other corporate actors or mandate significantly
greater attorney disclosure, which would have threatened client
confidences. 163 Section 307 is not perfect, but Congress did seek to
strike a balance between competing interests. 164 The SEC has now
largely followed Congress's lead, 165 and legal organizations have
come to accept at least the up-the-ladder approach. 1
66
The criminal defense bar and its supporters may have the
greatest fear of codification, given legislative propensities to favor
law enforcement interests. 67  Yet, at this point, even this
constituency should view codification as an attractive option. Not
only will they have pro-privilege allies, 168 but recent developments,
160. Letter from Robert E. Hirshon to Senator John Edwards, supra note 85
(stating the opposition of the ABA to federal legislation or agency regulations
of attorney professional conduct); see also supra notes 20-23 and
accompanying text (discussing the ABA's and law firms' opposition to the
regulation of attorney professionalism).
161. See Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 15, at 220 (describing how
then-Chairman Harvey Pitt did not respond to requests for assistance on
addressing the conduct of lawyers).
162. See id. at 220-21 (describing how Congress included the amendment
that became Section 307 despite pressure from legal organizations).
163. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
164. In my view, Sarbanes-Oxley's primary shortcomings lie elsewhere. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
166. See, Moser & Keller, supra note 27, at 837; Letter from Alfred P.
Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association, to the Securities Exchange
Commission (April 2, 2003) (accepting the up-the-ladder provisions,
while seeking some clarification in the final rules), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/aba040203.htm. Indeed, with the
recent changes, the ABA's model rules now provide for up-the-ladder
reporting that is very similar to those contained in the SEC's rules. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2004); see also ABA Task Force
Report, supra note 56, at 166-70, 174-76 (discussing such changes).
167. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 155.
168. This was demonstrated by the widespread and swift reaction of the
ABA and other legal organizations to perceived threats to the privilege and
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including a potentially unwieldy crime-fraud exception, the
monitoring of communications, and aggressive prosecutorial tactics,
also show a marked deterioration of privilege protections in the
criminal context. 169 Some of these developments are, as a practical
matter, largely beyond judicial control. Other protections depend
upon judges' acceptance of privilege doctrines that may result in the
exclusion of evidence in the particular criminal matters before them,
a context in which the pressure to be permissive may be at its
greatest.
Thus, although the common-law approach to developing
privilege doctrine offers some advantages, it offers no realistic
potential for self-correction or meaningful change. Codification
therefore offers the only avenue for reform. Yes, it is not without
risk, but for the above reasons, and because the current regime is
both costly and harmful to the aims of the privilege, codification is
worth that risk.
B. What Type of Codification?
In Federalizing Privilege, I advocated federal privilege
legislation that would be statutory, preemptive, and applicable both
in judicial and non-judicial proceedings. 170  I showed why this
approach would produce a level of certainty sufficient to reap the
potential benefits of the privilege while reducing its transaction
costs. 17 1 At the same time, I argued that less ambitious reforms, such
as a codification that applies only in federal question and federal
criminal cases, offer potential benefits but do not address other
causes of uncertainty, such as confusing and conflicting state-law
doctrines and the growing mass of non-judicial adjudications.172 The
recent developments discussed in this Article strengthen the case for
a single, national, attorney-client privilege. Sarbanes-Oxley, for
example, not only signals a congressional willingness to alter the law
governing lawyers and accordingly, the law governing attorney-
client confidentiality in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley and by similar
responses to the Justice Department's monitoring rule. See supra notes 20-23.
169. See discussion infra Part I.B.
170. Glynn, supra note 6, at 146-51 (advocating national privilege
legislation that would preempt contrary state privilege law for various reasons).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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client confidences, but also suggests another reason for doing so. If
Congress views the attorney-client privilege as part of a legal
framework that potentially fosters compliance with federal law, then
it has an interest in ensuring that nonfederal decision makers (e.g.,
state legislatures, individual judges, arbitrators, and agencies) do not
threaten legitimate privilege protections or create uncertainties that
undercut the privilege's compliance-enhancing effects. 173  In
addition, recent judicial decisions demonstrate that interjurisdictional
conflicts continue to abound, and other developments offer further
evidence that federal and state judges are losing the ability to protect
client confidences.
Yet, among all possible outcomes, this kind of reform is the
most unlikely.' 74 A codification of federal privilege law that is non-
preemptive, that applies only to matters involving federal questions
(civil and criminal), is far more probable. Such reform, although
more limited, would still be beneficial. A set of federal rules that
delineates the elements of the privilege, defines the scope of the
privilege's exceptions, and clarifies the circumstances in which
privilege protections are waived would bring far greater certainty-
and undoubtedly enhance the perception of certainty-in the federal
context. This is particularly true if the code makes explicit that
privilege protections are unqualified, or, in other words, not subject
to ex post judicial modifications or exceptions. And this set of rules
will provide federal leadership on the privilege, which has been
largely absent since Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 175 This leadership will, over time, promote convergence
and, accordingly, greater certainty. 176 Some disparate state-law
approaches may remain, but, overall, parameters of the privilege are
likely to be far more certain than they are today.
Nevertheless, if reform at the federal level is limited in this way,
those involved in drafting the new code ought to think broadly about
how to maximize the benefits of codification. Such thinking, which
173. Id.
174. In private correspondence, Professor Broun has made this point a
number of times. I agree that this type of reform is a long shot.
175. See supra note 97.
176. See Broun, supra note 104, at 789-90 (discussing convergence in other
areas of evidence since enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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has received insufficient attention in the debate over privilege
reform, requires looking beyond the four comers of privilege
doctrine itself to other means of ensuring that communications that
should be privileged are in fact protected. Thus, there are additional
suggestions for ways to enhance the benefits of a federally codified
privilege.
First, and fundamentally, the drafters should recognize that the
privilege is a doctrine that provides substantive protections for client
confidences, rather than a mere procedural rule. This conception is
consistent with Congress's decision to reject the set of rules
governing evidentiary privileges that the Supreme Court originally
proposed as part of the original Federal Rules of Evidence. 177
Indeed, although the privilege has procedural effects, its end is
extrajudicial influence over primary conduct, including compliance
with the law.178  Federal privilege legislation embodying this
conception would be both broader and more effective. For example,
because the ends of the privilege are extrajudicial, there is no reason
why its means, the protection of client confidences, ought to be
limited to judicial proceedings. As emphasized above, the status of
privilege protections in the growing mass of extrajudicial
adjudicatory proceeding contributes to uncertainty. A federally
codified attorney-client privilege therefore ought to apply not only in
federal question and federal criminal cases, but also to proceedings
involving federal matters outside federal court, including, inter alia,
federal agency proceedings, proceedings before SROs operating
under a federal regulatory mandate, arbitration proceedings involving
underlying federal questions, and perhaps matters adjudicated before
military tribunals.
As a practical matter, this view provides another reason, in
addition to process concerns and other constraints discussed above,
why Congress should codify the privilege instead of delegating
reform to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court and its judicial
rule making bodies have no authority to extend the privilege beyond
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, while the Advisory
Committee and the Judicial Conference certainly should participate
177. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 88-89, 165.
178. See id.
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in the drafting process, a new privilege code containing such broad
privilege protections must be statutory.
Second, the effectiveness of privilege reform depends, in part,
on ensuring that federal law enforcement officials and agencies do
not act in ways that cause excessive erosion of privilege protections.
Although Congress may or may not choose to rein in federal officials
and regulators, if such reform is going to happen, it will most likely
be through comprehensive privilege legislation, where the
interrelationship between such practices and the ends of the privilege
are apparent. Congress is also in the best position to determine the
extent to which government actions that erode privilege protections
(e.g., prisoner monitoring, heavy-handed prosecutorial techniques,
and forced disclosures) are truly necessary to serve legitimate law
enforcement interests. Although there is no guarantee that Congress
would strike the right balance, Sarbanes-Oxley offers some reason
for optimism. With assistance and feedback from multiple
constituencies, Congress is far more likely to do so than the agencies
themselves, or than judges whose oversight is either ineffective or
post hoc.
Third, Congress and the Advisory Committee ought to consider
additional "procedural" changes that will facilitate expedited review
and hopefully clarification of any ambiguities in new privilege rules.
They should consider, for example, providing for expanded
interlocutory appellate review of some kinds of privilege
determinations. Likewise, Congress should consider amending the
Federal Arbitration Act to provide for judicial review of privilege
determinations in arbitration proceedings governed by the new
privilege code. These kinds of mechanisms will increase the courts'
ability to resolve interpretation issues in a timely manner, enhancing
certainty.
Finally, even if Congress does not regulate the substance of state
privilege law, it can substantially increase certainty by adopting a
national privilege choice-of-law rule along with privilege rules
governing federal matters. 179 A choice-of-law rule would not bring
179. Currently, states apply varying choice-of-law rules in determining
which privilege doctrine applies when there is a conflict. See Glynn, supra
note 6, at 121-25; Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Territorial Solution, 52 U. Prr-r. L. REv. 909, 916-18 (1991).
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about uniformity, but uniformity is not necessary as long as attorneys
and clients are able to predict with reasonable confidence (at the time
of their communication) the state privilege law that would govern
their communications. Congress has an obvious interest in
addressing cross-border issues, and regulating the implications of
conflicting state laws on interstate economic activity may not face
the same political obstacles as preemption.' 80 Such a choice-of-law
rule should offer predictable outcomes and results consistent with the
interests the privilege seeks to serve. The territorial rule originally
proposed by Professor Bradford, applying the law of the jurisdiction
in which the attorney involved in the communication practices, may
meet these criteria, although there may be other appropriate
alternatives.' 81 This reform, combined with the others described
above, would go a long way toward establishing a regime that
maximizes the benefits of the privilege while limiting its costs.
III. CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege is supposed to strike a difficult
balance between the social benefits and social costs which, for the
most part, cannot be quantified. The ongoing debate then, is not
simply over what the balance should be, which will always remain
controversial, but also who should decide what the balance should
be. To this point, courts have been allowed to make most of the
decisions regarding privilege doctrine, at least in the federal system
and many states. But the existing mess, which inflicts significant
transaction costs and threatens to undermine the social benefits of the
privilege, demonstrates that this is the wrong approach. Recent
developments, including the Sarbanes-Oxley experience and changes
in the nature of dispute resolution and law enforcement techniques,
only strengthen this conclusion.
180. Congress has, at times, chosen to establish choice-of-law principals in a
given area of regulation, rather than preempt the entire field. See, e.g., Int'l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (indicating that when Congress
enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972, it did not intend to preempt common-law
nuisance, but rather, established a choice-of-law principle in favor of the
common law of the source state rather than another state where the effects of
the pollution were felt).
181. See Bradford, supra note 179, at 948-49.
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It is therefore time to codify the privilege, at least at the federal
level. Federal codification poses risks, but it provides the opportunity
to resolve lingering conflicts, clarify amorphous standards, and
provide leadership that will promote convergence. It also allows
consideration of the broader implications of privilege and its
relationship to other areas of substantive legislation, which ought to
be part of the balancing of costs and benefits. A codified federal
privilege may embody a broader conception that allows regulation of
extra-judicial pressures on the privilege and extension of the doctrine
beyond the federal courts to non-judicial settings in which federal
claims are involved, if not to all adversarial proceedings.
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